Florida Law Review
Volume 58

Issue 3

Article 2

July 2006

Contract Theory and Contract Practice: Allocating Design
Responsibility in the Construction Industry
Carl J. Circo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carl J. Circo, Contract Theory and Contract Practice: Allocating Design Responsibility in the Construction
Industry, 58 Fla. L. Rev. 561 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Circo:
Contract Theory
and Contract
AllocatingPRACTICE:
Design Responsi
CONTRACT
THEORY
ANDPractice:
CONTRACT

ALLOCATING DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Carl J. Circo*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .....................................

562

CONTRACT, TORT, AND SHARED-DESIGN PRACTICES .......

567

A. Analyzing a Hypothetical Projectin Light of Liability
Theories and Multi-PartyInterdependence ............
B. The Hypothetical Project ..........................
C. Legal Theory in a PracticalIndustry .................
D. Interdependent Commercial Perspectives .............

567
568
572
582

Private Developer .............................
Public Owner-an Aside .......................
Lead Design Professional .......................
Specialty Designers ...........................
Prime Contractor .............................
Subcontractors and Specialty Trades ..............
Insurers .....................................
Sureties .....................................

584
591
595
598
601
603
604
614

CONTRACTS FOR DESIGN AND DESIGN FOR CONTRACTS .....

618

A. The Importance of Private Risk Allocation
in the ConstructionIndustry .......................

618

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
IlI.

B. Using BilateralContractsto Allocate

Shared-DesignLiability ...........................

622

C. A Proposalfor Multi-PartyProject Design

Agreem ents .....................................
IV.

CONCLUSION

......................................

633
637

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges those who provided advice, comments, and support for this Article. Professor Robert
Lawrence, of the University of Arkansas School of Law, Arthur E. Pape, of The Pape Law Firm
in Chicago, and Len Ruzicka, of Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP in St. Louis, each reviewed drafts
and gave insightful comments and helpful suggestions. Dean Steven L. Willbom graciously allowed
the author to discuss this topic at a faculty colloquium at the University of Nebraska College of
Law where faculty members raised many significant questions and offered valuable comments.
Jane Brackett, CPCU, ARM, formerly Risk Manager for Farmland Industries, Inc., provided
practical guidance on insurance matters. Sarah Ridgley, a third-year law student at the University
of Arkansas, provided skillful legal research support. All opinions and conclusions expressed here,
as well as any errors, are solely the responsibility of the author.
*

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

1

Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
58,REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 2
FLORIDA

[Vol. 58

I. INTRODUCTION

How much does legal theory matter to lawyers who advise clients
concerning building design and construction contracts? Theory thrives in
contract literature, as philosophers and legal scholars search for
justification, essence, coherence, and synthesis.' Lawyers litigating
contract cases also invoke and confront theory to develop a case,2 to
attempt to persuade a court,' to transform the application of the law to
particular facts,4 or to account for the jurisprudence of a specific judge or
court.' But of what interest is legal theory to construction lawyers in their
everyday practice? 6
This Article uses a current issue in construction and design contracts
to explore that question. While the issue here is an inherently practical one,
the analysis concludes that legal theory should matter a great deal to
construction lawyers. It also muses on far-reaching consequences of legal
theory important not only to the construction law bar and courts and
arbitration panels deciding design liability disputes, but also to the
professional and trade associations, insurers, and sureties that are the other
key institutions influencing the liability environment for the construction
industry. Perhaps those who address design and construction contracts
1. See generally RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT
LAW (1994) (providing a selection of readings on contract law that emphasize economics and moral
philosophy); A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995) (same).
2. See, e.g., City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420,422-23,425 (Minn. 1978)
(rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the court should abandon traditional rules governing the
liability of a design professional in favor of an implied warranty theory).
3. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989,996-97 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("In our view,
the analysis of both Bechtel and the district court is overly reliant upon contract theory to the point
of losing focus of the nature of the claim made here, which asserts negligence, rather than breach
of contract.").
4. See, e.g., Ortelere v. Teachers' Ret. Bd. of N.Y., 250 N.E.2d 460, 461-62, 464 (N.Y.
1969) (finding that a psychotic employee should be permitted to revoke her selection of retirement
benefits that proved unwise, and reasoning that "traditional standards governing competency to
contract" reflected a "primitive" understanding of mental faculties that did not "account for one
who by reason of mental illness is unable to control his conduct even though his cognitive ability
seems unimpaired").
5. See Alfred S. Konefsky, Freedomand Interdependence in Twentieth-Century Contract
Law: Traynor and Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1169, 1169-74 (1997)
(discussing, among other points, how jurists with contrasting perspectives on jurisprudence and
advocacy have analyzed whether a subcontractor's proposal may be revoked prior to acceptance
but after the contractor has relied on the proposal in submitting a successful bid for construction
work).
6. In this Article, the term "construction lawyers" includes not only lawyers who draft and
negotiate design and construction contracts, but also those who advise industry organizations that
promulgate contract forms and structures for construction projects and those who evaluate
construction contracting arrangements on behalf of insurers and sureties.
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without proper regard for legal theory may unwittingly tempt those
institutions to abandon a contract response to commercial risk analysis in
favor of a tort approach. Such abandonment, the argument concludes,
could have most unfortunate jurisprudential and practical results. To begin,
let us move from these abstractions to the extraordinarily practical
environment of the contemporary construction industry.
Buildings must withstand hurricanes,7 earthquakes, 8 fires, 9 and even
terrorist attacks.'0 They must provide secure and appropriate living,"
shopping,12 and working environments, 3 accommodate the disabled,' 4 use

7. See Blake v. Hi-Lu Corp., 781 So. 2d 1122, 1123-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (finding that
in an action against a builder, a jury verdict in favor of a homeowner on claims for violation of the
South Florida Building Code and negligent construction was proper, where the homeowner's roof
could not withstand hurricane force winds).
8. See Walsh v. W. Valley Mission Cmty. Coll. Dist., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725, 726 (Ct. App.'
1998) (referring to a California building code requirement that school buildings must be designed
to resist major earthquake forces).
9. See Foster v. Bue, 749 S.W.2d 736,741 (Tenn. 1988) (discussing the potential liabilities
of the supervising contractor and the trade contractor for fire damage allegedly caused by the trade
contractor's construction of a fireplace flue, but finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that
defendant's construction method either was in violation of the building or the fire code, or
constituted a defect rendering the house uninhabitable).
10. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279,298-301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the
owners and operators of the World Trade Center buildings "owed a duty to the occupants to create
and implement adequate fire safety measures, even in the case of a fire caused by criminals such
as those who hijacked flights 11 and 75 on September 11, 2001"); Cipriani Fifth Ave., LLC v.
RPCI Landmark Props., LLC, 782 N.Y.S.2d 522, 522-23, 529 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (denying a
Rockefeller Center restaurant operator's motion to preliminarily enjoin the Rockefeller Center
lessor from carrying out alleged violations of its lease obligations, including installing metal
detectors to screen the restaurant's employees and guests after September 11, 2001).
11. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Gwathmey Siegel & Assocs. Architects, 192 A.D.2d 151,
156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (reversing a summary judgment dismissing Columbia University's
claim against its general contractor for negligent design and construction of student residences that
resulted in dangerous conditions).
12. See Lieber v. Macy's W., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1075-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding
that department store access barriers violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12182 (1994)).
13. See Gast v. Shell Oil Co., 819 S.W.2d 367, 368,371 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (holding that
a contractor could not be held liable in a wrongful death action brought by the parents of a gas
station shooting victim where "the contractor's undertaking was to follow the [gas stations] owner's
specifications," and the specifications were not "'so imperfect or improper that the... contractor
should realize that the work done thereunder [would] make the structure or condition unsafe'
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 384 cmt. f (1965))).
14. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12183, 12188-12189 (2005);
Lieber, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1075-80.
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energy efficiently, 5 take advantage of new forms of technology,1 6 meet
demanding environmental standards,17 and facilitate data transmission and
communications. 18 A typical office building, shopping center, multi-family
project, or manufacturing facility involves several highly specialized
components and systems.' 9
Under contemporary construction practices, it is often inefficient for
the design professional or firm that provides an overall project design to
retain responsibility for all critical aspects of project design.2 ° In an
increasing number of projects, trade contractors, equipment and systems
manufacturers and suppliers, component fabricators, and specialty
consultants provide or arrange for important specialty designs.2 " This
collaboration raises significant questions within the construction industry
and for the lawyers, insurers, and sureties who serve the industry. Who
should be liable for design defects under these circumstances? More
importantly, what principles, process, and authority should establish the
rules for allocating, insuring and otherwise managing design liability?
Contract practices in the construction industry have not yet adapted to
the trend toward shared-design projects.2 In the construction industry the

15. See Erickson v. Oberlohr, 749 P.2d 996, 997-99 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
evidence that a solar heating system promoted for its energy efficiency was incorrectly installed
supported plaintiffs implied warranty claim against a builder-vendor).
16. See CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc. v. ACEC Maine, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 159, 160, 162 (D.
Me. 1992) (enforcing liquidated damages provisions under a contract for the construction of an
electrical generating facility that established a deadline for the contractor to conduct a performance
test demonstrating that the facility met output and heat rate efficiencies at guaranteed levels).
17. See Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n v. Envirotech Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1152, 1159 (D. Colo.
1981) (involving a failure of air pollution control equipment described by the court as "extremely
large, complex, technically intricate, and essentially irreplaceable now that it is in place").
18. See Robert D. Lane, Jr. & Ajay Raju, Wired Buildings: Extending the Last Mile of
Internet Access to Commercial Tenants 12-13 (Aug. 2000) (unpublished paper, available at
http://www.acrel.orglDocuments/Seminars/a002158.pdf).
19. See Iris D. Tommelein & Glenn Ballard, CoordinatingSpecialists, J. CONSTRUCTION
ENGINEERING & MGMT., Apr. 1998, at 1, available at http://www.leanconstruction.org/pdf/
coordinating specialists.pdf. Sometimes the same is even true of residential construction. See St.
Paul Cos. v. Constr. Mgmt. Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1095-96 (D. Mont. 2000) (involving a
situation where, in addition to contracting with a general contractor, a residential owner also
contracted with five separate trade contractors for specialized wiring work).
20. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. URS Co., No. 64496, 1994 WL 520862, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 648 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 1995) (specialty design for
planetarium dome design); Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'g Co., 442 P.2d 621, 622 (Wash. 1968)
(specialty design of ice rink).
21. See generally Alan B. Stover, Constructionand Design Contracts, in CONSTRUCTION
LAW § 3.05[31[d] (Steven G.M. Stein ed., 2005) (discussing "design delegation" and liability for
architect's errors and omissions).
22. This Article explores in detail one of several legal issues relating to shared-design
practices that were identified in an earlier article. See generally Carl J. Circo, When Specialty
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two most common contract conventions, or project delivery systems,
assume centralized responsibility for project design. In one of these
conventions, the traditional design-bid-build system, the project owner or
developer retains an architect or engineer to design the project and
separately hires a builder to construct the project in accordance with that
design.23 The traditional system divides the construction process into three
distinct phases that proceed largely in a linear manner. These phases are
project design, followed by solicitation of construction bids or proposals,
and finally actual construction.24 When a project uses the design-bid-build
system, the project owner enters into two main contracts for the project.25
First, the project owner (who may either be the intended user of the project
or a developer) enters into a contract with an architect who converts the
owner's requirements and ideas for the project into detailed drawings and
specifications.26 The owner then uses those plans to find an acceptable
building contractor. 2' Finally, the owner incorporates those detailed
construction plans into a second contract, which is the construction
contract with a building contractor who will, in turn, execute the plans.2"
In the second common project delivery system, design-build, the owner or
developer engages a single firm both to furnish the complete design and
to build the project. 29 Both systems presume that a single professional or
firm working under a contract with the owner maintains ultimate design
responsibility for substantially the entire project.
The practice of shared-design responsibility does not fall into either of
these conventions. While the industry has noted the unique challenges that
delegated and specialty designs present, industry responses to date fail to
recognize that these practices raise new issues about the basis for imposing
design liability.3" This failure results in part from inadequate

Designs Cause Building Disasters: Responsibility for Shared Architectural and Engineering

Services, 84 NEB. L. REv. 162 (2005) (examining "the development, current legal status, and longrange legal implications of shared design"). Others, especially construction industry commentators,
also have identified potential problems posed by specialty design, but the existing literature does
not explore whether the optimum solution requires a comprehensive, contract-based approach. See
sources cited infra note 30.
23. See generally 2 PHILPL. BRUNER & PATRICKJ. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O'CONNOR

ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 6:2 (database updated 2005) (discussing the choice of project delivery
approach and making general observations about the design-bid-build delivery method).
24. See id. §§ 6:2, 6:3.
25. See id. § 6:4.
26. See id. § 6:2.
27. See id.
28. See id. § 6:4.
29. See James S. Schenck, IV, Introduction,in THE DEsIGN/BUILD DESKBOOK 1-1 (John R.
Heisse, II & James S. Schenck, IV eds., 3d ed. 2004).
30. See, e.g., Mark C. Friedlander, Design-Buildand MIE Systems: Some Legal Concerns,
CONSULTING SPECIFYING ENG'R, June 1, 2001, at 13 (stating that the law is developing to allow
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attention to the controlling theories of liability. At the very least, legal
theory must furnish the context to facilitate practical adjustments in
contract practices.
This Article argues that the liability risks arising from contemporary
shared-design practices should drive the lawyers, professional and trade
associations, insurers, and sureties serving the construction industry
toward innovative contract and risk management solutions. This new
approach to allocating design liability must recognize that shared-design
responsibility creates an interdependence among those who design and
build project components, a relationship that requires a more
comprehensive contract solution. What is just as important is that if the
industry collectively falls to establish workable contract models, the courts
will inevitably intervene with less efficient and less effective tort
solutions. 3
As these introductory remarks suggest, the analysis here concerns itself
with legal theory as well as with industry practices. This is so because
shared-design practices create multi-party commercial relationships that
test the boundaries between tort law and contract law. In the end, however,
the inquiry here is a practical one that resorts only subtly to legal theory.

design delegation); Milton F. Lunch, Revised A201 Leaves Many Design Delegation Issues
Unclear,BLDG. DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Dec. 1997, at 29 (explaining that revised A201 still
"leave[s] unanswered a host of questions that ultimately will be resolved by court decisions");
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Delegationof Design Responsibilityto ConstructionContractors:
What Are the Risks?, NASH & CIBINIC REP., Nov. 1993, at 65 (analyzing whether Government
agencies "can avoid liability by ... delegat[ing] . . . design responsibility [to construction
contractors] and whether it is wise for the Government to do so even if liability can be avoided");
Carrie Okizaki, Design Delegation, in THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK 285 (Daniel S.
Brennan et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the controversy in the construction industry regarding the
"extent to which a design professional may delegate to a contactor the responsibility for designing
certain aspects of a project"); Nancy N. Potter, Design Delegation Provisions of AIA Document
A201, 1997 Edition, CONSTRUCTION LAW., July 1998, at 30 (discussing whether "the new
A201 ... merely 'codiflies]' existing practice without significantly altering the method of design
delegation"); Iris D. Tommelein & Glenn Ballard, Coordinating Specialists, J. OF CONSTR.
ENGINEERING AND MGMT., Apr. 1998, at 1, 10 (explaining the coordination and management
challenges in specialty design projects); Editorial, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Sept. 30, 1991,
at 110 (asserting that contractors and other non-design firms "should be able to voluntarily perform
design work collateral to their construction or supply activities under the careful supervision of
licensed professionals").
31. Left mostly for another day is the arguably more troubling probability that industry
lobbyists will convince legislators and regulators to craft biased political and bureaucratic solutions.
Cf. Gen. Bldg. Contractors of N.Y. State, Inc. v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 670 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698700 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (reflecting conflicting lobbying efforts of industry trade associations to
influence regulation of delegated design responsibility); Allen Holt Gwyn & Paul E. Davis, FiftyState Survey of Anti-Indemnity Statutes and Related Case Law, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Summer
2003, at 26 (reporting on the increasing number of state legislatures that have passed statutory
restrictions against broad indemnity provisions in construction contracts).
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To the extent that the practical argument here advances a theoretical one,
it is that tort theory threatens to become a pervasive force in allocating
liability arising from shared-design practices, yet a tort approach is
inherently inferior to a contract approach for allocating liability for
property damage and economic injury in light of the commercial
relationships involved. As a result, the construction industry, with the
enlightened assistance of lawyers representing industry participants,
should evolve new contract conventions to address the unique liability
issues that shared-design practices present. Not as an entirely incidental
observation on long-extant scholarly ruminations, this Article supports
contract as a dynamic force, at least for the continued vitality of the
commercial construction industry.32
Part II of this Article uses a hypothetical project to explore how shareddesign responsibility affects the jurisprudence of design liability as well
as how it colors the risk assessments and negotiating positions of distinct
participants in the construction process. It suggests that the marketplace in
which those participants operate provides a vibrant environment for a
comprehensive, contract-based allocation of design liability. It also argues
that the tort system is too unpredictable and uncontrollable to manage the
important commercial relationships involved. Part III suggests some
specific contract-based compromises that may emerge as participants seek
common ground to allocate design liability in an industry that has evolved
toward greater distribution of design activities. The simplest of those
compromises may appear as new patterns in traditional, bilateral contracts
to take into account the roles of those other than the contracting parties.
The more comprehensive approaches, however, will require multi-party
agreements among the interdependent participants; these may in turn
facilitate new insurance products and other risk management techniques
and may even bring fundamental changes to the dominant project delivery
systems.
II. CONTRACT, TORT, AND SHARED-DESIGN PRACTICES

A. Analyzing a Hypothetical Project in Light of Liability Theories
and Multi-Party Interdependence
Even as the design-build movement seems poised to overtake the
dominance of the traditional project delivery system,3 3 shared-design

32. See infra Part II.C.
33. Estimates of the proportion of all U.S. construction using the design-build system vary
depending on the source consulted, the type of construction involved, and whether statistics are
based on the number of projects or the value of projects. The Design-Build Institute of America
estimates that in 2005, design-bid-build will account for approximately fifty percent of non-
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practices threaten to eclipse the distinction between the traditional and
design-build structures. The interdependent multi-party relationships that
characterize this new variation on the design-build theme present some
interesting questions about the allocation of design liability. First, as a
matter of legal theory, is contract or tort the better construct for allocating
design liability when multiple participants play interdependent design
roles? Second, what theoretical and practical mischief may unfold when
participants in shared-design projects fail to address the liability issues
comprehensively through contracts? Finally, how and with what effect
might lawyers who recognize the potential liability implications of the
shared-design phenomenon restructure conventional contractual
arrangements? The discussion that follows suggests that both legal
scholars and legal counselors might profitably look to a comprehensive
contract approach to bring order to this small comer of law and commerce.
B. The Hypothetical Project
A specific hypothetical will help focus the discussion on two examples
of shared-design arrangements in a context that highlights several key
design liability issues. Moreover, by presenting a stylized case study, this
hypothetical project brings the discussion more quickly to that point at
which legal liability relating to shared design may fall in the interstice
between tort and contract. Although the project presented here is not a real
one, its shared-design aspects derive from features of actual cases
involving liability for defective specialty designs.34
residential projects, design-build for approximately forty percent, and construction management
for most of the balance. DESIGN-BUILD INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, NON-RESIDENTIAL DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION INTHE UNITED STATES, http://www.dbia.org/indinfo/mktchrt.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2006). Another source reports that a 2003 survey showed the following percentages of
projects used design-build: sixty-eight percent of power and communications industry projects;
fifty-eight percent of sports and recreation facilities; fifty-seven percent of industrial plants,
refineries, and warehouses; and fifty-six percent of medical facilities. Joe Gose, Design-BuildGoes
Mainstream, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR, Apr. 1, 2003, http://www.nreionline.com/news/
developer/real estatedesignbuild-goesmainstream/. However one measures or reports the data,
the number of design-build projects has been increasing for many years and has now reached the
point that it challenges the dominance of the traditional system. See Schenck, supra note 29, at 1-1
to 1-2.
34. Two cases in particular suggested the idea of a prominent and highly specialized
structural feature designed by a manufacturer rather than by the lead design team. See Bd. of Educ.
v. URS Co., No. 64496, 1994 WL 520862, at *1 (Ohio Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 648 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 1995); Filmland Dev., Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., Nos.
B136497, B140556, 2002 WL 31693595, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2002) (unpublished and
"noncitable" opinion). The first case involved a project to build a science classroom building and
a planetarium dome. URS Co., 1994 WL 502862, at *1. After extensive interviews and
investigation, the school district's architect recommended The Dow Chemical Company to design
and construct the dome because of the specialized nature of planetarium domes. Id. at * 1-2. Both
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Our hypothetical project presents a public-private collaboration that
includes a commercial office tower and a county government center
anchored around a spacious, glass-enclosed, multi-story atrium that serves
as a common area between the two functional units. The atrium is a
showcase feature that will provide a signature design for the project. The
project owner is a real estate developer. The developer's design team will
furnish a design concept for the entire project, and will also furnish the
detailed drawings and specifications used for construction purposes, with
two major exceptions. First, because of the technical demands of a large,
glass-enclosed structure, the developer's design team has recommended
that the manufacturer of the structural steel frame for the atrium should
furnish the detailed engineering for the atrium. Second, the county, which
will purchase and occupy the government center upon completion of the
project, requires that a pre-selected security consultant design an
integrated security system for the entire project. Except for these two
limited specialty design components, the project delivery system is the
traditional design-bid-build one in which the owner contracts separately
with an architectural firm for the project design and with a general
contractor for construction in accordance with that design.
In keeping with common practices, the developer, as the owner of the
project, retained an architectural firm to provide the project design. In
accordance with the agreement between the architect and the developer,
the architect selected a cadre of engineers to work as consultants to the
architect to provide such matters as the civil, structural, electrical, and
mechanical engineering details. This lead design team will first prepare
preliminary drawings showing the design concept for the entire project,
including the overall project configuration, the individual building
locations and sizes, the atrium and its main features, and the appearance
the lead architect and Dow Chemical were involved in presenting the planetarium plans for
preliminary approval purposes, after which the school board entered into a construction contract
for the entire project with a general contractor who subcontracted the detailed design and exterior
of the dome to Dow Chemical. Id. at *1-3. The architect served as project manager for the entire
project during construction. Id. at *3. The second case involved a project to build a U-shaped office
building that featured a central glass atrium. Filmland Dev., 2002 WL 31693595, at *1. The
subcontractor arranged for the manufacturer to design and engineer a metal structure and to
manufacture the parts for the frame, which was described as "a lattice of aluminum tubes joined
at spherical metal nodes." Id. The building itself withstood the force of the 1994 Northridge
earthquake, but the earthquake caused some of the frame's tubes to break or detach, possibly due
either to the manufacturer's design defects or to the subcontractor' s installation errors, or both. Id.
at *2. Although these two cases offer facts suggestive of the atrium for the hypothetical project,
neither serves as precedent for any analysis in this Article. The idea for a security system designed
by a consultant selected by a government end user reflects the heightened importance of building
security, which now accompanies every high profile project, especially those that will include
government functions.
35. bySee
BRUNER
& O'CONNOR,
supra note
23, § 6:4.
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of all other major architectural features. In addition to the atrium, these
conceptual plans will show common areas for the use of all occupants of
the project that include landscaping, access routes, walkways connecting
each facility with the common atrium, and underground parking to be
located below the atrium.
Several key participants will review and comment on the preliminary
plans. This includes the developer, the county's contract administrator, and
officials representing various planning, building code, and other
departments of the local jurisdictions that will issue the required building
permits and other governmental approvals required for the project.
Following those reviews, the developer's design team will ultimately
prepare a set of construction drawings to be issued to a single prime
contractor, to be selected by the developer. The prime contractor's main
role will be to retain and manage the team of subcontractors and suppliers
who will execute the project design.
Different arrangements, however, apply to the detailed designs for the
atrium and the security system. The architect's plans will identify the
company that will provide the atrium steel frame. The prime contractor
will issue a subcontract to that company to design, fabricate, and install the
frame system in accordance with the architect's design concept. The
construction documents issued by the developer's design team, which will
be incorporated into the agreement between the developer and the prime
contractor, will require the steel fabricator to submit a complete set of
construction drawings, sealed by a licensed structural engineer retained by
the fabricator, for all structural elements of the atrium.
Additionally, as part of its turnkey contract to sell the government
center to the county upon completion, the developer has agreed to retain
a specific security consultant identified by the county to develop a
comprehensive security program that will include equipment and systems
to monitor and control access and activity around the clock for the entire
project. That consultant will submit the detailed design of the project
security system for review and comment by the county, the owner's lead
design team, and the prime contractor. On the basis of that design, the
prime contractor will issue purchase orders and subcontracts to the security
equipment manufacturers and installers designated by the consultant. As
is the case with construction of the atrium, the prime contractor will
coordinate the installation of the security system along with the balance of
the project construction.
The project architect and its engineering consultants will review
submissions showing the engineering designs for the atrium and for the
security system before issuing the construction drawings, but do so solely
for the purpose of confirming that they are consistent with the design
intent and the conceptual documents prepared by the owner's design team.
At that time, the developer will approve the final plans and deliver to the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2
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prime contractor the complete set of construction drawings. The prime
contractor will then submit to the owner, as the basis for the construction
contract between the developer and the prime contractor, a construction
proposal that establishes a definitive price and completion schedule for the
total project. Construction will begin promptly after the prime contractor
and the developer sign the construction contract.
The prime contractor will oversee construction of the entire project and
will issue multiple subcontracts and purchase orders to delegate distinct
construction activities to trade contractors, manufacturers, and suppliers.
As is customary, the construction drawings will contemplate that the prime
contractor will receive from subcontractors and suppliers certain final
details for various components and systems in the form of shop drawings,
material samples, and other submittals. The prime contractor will forward
these details to the owner and the architect in accordance with the
construction administration procedures established by the developer-prime
contractor and developer-architect agreements. The architect and its design
team will continue to provide services to the developer during construction
for such purposes as responding to inquiries for clarifications from the
prime contractor and its construction team, preparing change orders,
reviewing the shop drawings and other submittals, reviewing the progress
of construction, approving progress payments to the prime contractor, and
issuing certificates of substantial completion and final completion.
Several contractual features of this arrangement have special
significance for the purposes of this Article. Although the project delivery
system resembles the traditional one that differentiates sharply between
design and construction responsibilities, two critically important design
functions have been excluded from the developer-architect relationship
and injected into other relationships. The security system design will be
provided by a consultant who has been selected by the county, but who
will be retained under a separate contract entered into by the developer. In
an era of terrorism, this process presents important public safety
implications for a prominent project that serves both government and
private functions. At the same time, a critical component of the project's
engineering has also been excluded from the developer-architect
relationship, and it has been incorporated into the prime contractor's
responsibility in the form of a special design-build subcontract. With the
exception of the atrium, the prime contractor does not otherwise serve as
a design-builder for this project.
The participants, therefore, find themselves operating under a hybrid
project delivery system in which one specialty designer will be retained
directly by the developer outside of the architect's lead design team and
another specialty designer will be a subcontractor to the prime contractor
who is otherwise outside of the chain of design responsibility. The
specialty designer for the atrium, although initially identified by the
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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developer's architect, will have a contract with the prime contractor, who
presumably has no expertise in structural steel or atrium design. The
specialty designer for the security system, although selected by the county,
has a contract with the developer, who presumably has no expertise in
security system design. Neither of the two specialty designers has a
contract with the lead architect. Finally, although neither specialty
designer is part of the architect's design team, the architect and other
members of its team will play important roles in establishing the criteria
and requirements for the specialty designs as well as in the process by
which the specialty designs will be coordinated and integrated with the
overall project design. In short, with the introduction of two seemingly
isolated variations on a conventional theme, this situation creates a unique
web of legal and commercial relationships. It presents challenges that
involve contractual and non-contractual relations among the participants,
as well as special considerations important to each participant's lawyers36
and insurers and to any sureties who may be involved.
C. Legal Theory in a PracticalIndustry
The fundamental theoretical issue is whether to use tort or contract
principles to address design liability questions. Tort law and contract law
represent overlapping legal systems for distributing responsibility for loss
and damage produced by human endeavors.37 In American law today, the
more expansive and policy driven of these two systems is tort law, by
which courts, as a matter of public policy, impose duties on actors to avoid
causing injury to others.38 Contract law, by contrast, provides remedies
under relatively limited circumstances for injury caused by broken
promises.39 In an essential sense, one might say that contract is the branch
of the common law that concerns legally enforceable relationships defined
primarily by the assent of the parties, especially commercial agreements,

36. Due to the popularity of construction industry form contracts, it is difficult to state any
general rule about the role that lawyers may play in drafting and negotiating contracts for a project
such as the hypothetical situation presents. Given the size and complexity of the hypothetical
project, however, it is likely that the key participants would seek the advice of legal counsel even
though they may base their negotiations on common industry contract forms.
37. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.7 (2d ed. 1998).
Professor Gilmore delightfully explored the overlap in his famous hyperbole. See GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-90 (1974).
38. See GILMORE, supranote 37, at 87,90; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: 139-

79 (expanded ed. 2003).
39. "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). See generally FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 3-39
(Richard Craswell & Alan Schwartz eds., 1994) (discussing the normative underpinnings of
contract law).
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while tort is the branch of the common law that concerns most other civil
relationships not governed by other specific branches of the law.'
A tort approach has obvious attraction when design activities create the
unreasonable risk of bodily or personal injury to one who is not a direct
party to the design services agreement involved, at least if the victim
cannot claim third-party beneficiary status.41 For example, an engineer
may be liable in tort when a defectively designed store sign falls on a store
customer during a windstorm.42 Similarly, an engineer who negligently
recommends acceptance of an improperly designed intersection may be
liable to a person injured in an accident at that intersection.43 Cases of this
kind, however, have little relevance to the theoretical competition between
tort and contract theory at issue here because no option for a contract
remedy can exist absent a relevant contract. Tort is the only available
route.
A contract approach would seem more natural than a tort one, however,
when design activity causes damage to commercial participants in the
construction process." To begin with, virtually every business that
becomes involved with the modem construction industry does so under the
auspices of some sort of agreement. Furthermore, one could scarcely find
a human activity that is more commercial than building design and
construction. The industry represents an enormous segment of all

40. Although appealing scholarly criticisms challenge many of the possible distinctions
between contract and tort, most discussions at least concede to contract the more conventional
issues concerning written commercial bargains between parties having equal bargaining position.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond PromissoryEstoppel: ContractLaw and
the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CIn. L. REv. 903,905-06,945 (1985); Peter Linzer, Uncontracts:
Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 139, reprinted in A
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 82-91 (Peter Linzer ed., 1989). Professor Farnsworth distinguishes
contract law and tort law on the basis that contract law "concerns planning for the future" and tort
law "imposes liability to remedy wrongful violations of recognized interests." 1 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 37, at 25.
41. See, e.g., Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Gwathmey Siegel & Assocs. Architects, 601
N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that a design-build contractor owed a duty of care to
the owner and the public for safe design and construction of a college dormitory because a project
of that nature "is so affected with the public interest that the failure to perform competently can
have catastrophic consequences"). The courts have not been eager to imply a third-party beneficiary
motive into contracts for design services. See, e.g., Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co.,
355 F. Supp. 376, 392-93 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
42. See, e.g., Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 222 N.E.2d 584,588 (111. App. Ct. 1966) (finding
that the engineer "defendants owed a duty.., to those members of the general public who can be
reasonably anticipated to be present in the structure they designed when negligence in design is a
causal factor in injuries sustained through collapse of the building").
43. See Robert & Co. Assocs. v. Tigner, 351 S.E.2d 82, 84, 86-87 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
44. This Article does not address liability for personal injuries suffered by construction
workers.
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economic activity,45 and those who participate in it must manage enormous
financial and economic risks.' Residential construction aside,47 a large
proportion of those involved are sophisticated business entities, and even
those who are relatively unsophisticated recognize that design and
construction activities involve important legal relationships that require
deliberate risk allocation.4"
It would be difficult to find an industry that seems more attuned to
liability risks than is the construction industry. The considerable risks that
building construction entails attract the constant concern of those who
develop,49 finance,50 design, 5' and build 2 construction projects. The
industry has developed highly structured methods for managing those
risks.53 Those methods include cost estimating and accounting
procedures,5 4

scheduling

tools, 55 safety

programs, 56

well-defined

45. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in
a TransactionalSystem, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 463, 465.
46. See 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 7:179-:230.55.
47. Consumer protection laws and other special considerations may properly remove
residential construction from the exclusive realm of contract analysis. See Stipanowich, supra note
45, at 502-05. See generally Michael D. Turner, Paradigms, Pigeonholes, and Precedent:
Reflections on Regulatory Control of Residential Construction, 23 WHrfrIER L. REV. 3 (2001)
(discussing the "battle between competing economic self-interests ... and selection of building
codes regulating residential construction standards").
48. A recent issue of a popular journal for construction lawyers is dedicated to insurance
coverage developments affecting the construction industry. CONSTRUCTION LAW., Summer 2005.
Among other things, this series of practical articles demonstrates that even small contractors and
specialty firms rely extensively on highly developed risk management techniques. See, e.g., Jack
P. Gibson & W. Jeffrey Woodward, The 2004 ISO Additional Insured Endorsement Revisions,
CONSTRUCrION LAW., Summer 2005, at 8.
49. See Kenneth M. Cushman & Joyce K. Hackenbrach, Construction Project Risk
Allocation: The Owner's Perspective,480 PLI/REAL 7, 9-10, 36 (2002).
50. See Stanley P. Sklar, A Short Guide to Construction Issuesfor the ConstructionLender,
485 PLIIREAL 441,445-59 (2002).
51. See Robert L. Meyers, III et al., Risk Allocation from the Designer's Perspective, 480
PLIIREAL 147 (2002).
52. See Jesse B. Grove, Ill, Risk Allocationfrom the Contractor'sPerspective:Philosophies
of Risk Allocation, 467 PLUREAL 41 (2001).
53. See 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 7:1-: 18.
54. See MATTHEW BENDER & Co., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY § 16.01 (2005).
55. See Thomas P. Carnery, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 633 F. Supp. 1273, 1281 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (involving use of critical path scheduling); 5 BRUNER &O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 15:1:10.
56. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.03-0264-L, 2005 WL
2284913, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Sep. 19, 2005); Moegan Tribal Gaming Auth. v. Kohn Pedersen Fox
Assocs., No. X04CV030127351S, 2003 WL 23177993, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003);
Indep. Ins. Agents v. Turnpike Auth., 876 P.2d 675, 676 (Okla. 1994); 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR,
supra note 23, § 7:60.
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professions and specialty trades,5 7 and neatly tailored insurance and surety
products.58 All this might logically dictate that both the freedom and the
sanctity of contract should reign throughout the construction industry. For
these reasons, we might expect that when commercial actors engage in
building design and construction the courts should look almost exclusively
to the terms of the contracts the participants negotiate to determine where
losses should rest.
It seems surprising, therefore, that tort law rather than contract law
dominates as the theory of liability that governs damage and injury
resulting from building design activity. To observe this dominance of tort
law, one need only review scholarly discussions and practical treatises on
the liability of design professions, which bulge with tort principles and
cases but barely take note of the potential application of contract.59
The dominance of tort law over contract law in matters of building
design began in the nineteenth century with the development of
architectural and engineering malpractice law. 60 In the early cases, the
courts effortlessly expanded principles of tort liability into the purely
commercial relationships between participants in the construction
industry. 6 ' In effect, the courts long ago opted for a professional
malpractice analysis to redefine the contractual relationship created when
a client hires a design professional. And they did so with little regard for
contract theory. True, the courts routinely announced adherence to the
doctrinal line that an action in tort does not lie for breach of contract. 62 But
then they unceremoniously declared a duty of professional care owing
from designer to client that is both independent from the contract and yet
based on it.63 This duty, the cases reason, arises from the "special

57. See JUSTIN SwEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 28.01 (6th ed. 2000).
58. See 4 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 11.1 & 12.1; see also Patrick J.
O'Connor, Insurance Productsfor the Construction Industry, CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS, Oct.
2001, at 10 (discussing insurance issues that confront those involved in the construction industry).
59. See, e.g., Constance Frisby Fain, Architect and Engineer Liability, 35 WASHBURN L.J.
32,34 (1995); Steven G.M. Stein, Architect's DutiesandResponsibilities,in CONSTRUCTION LAW,
supra note 21, § 5; William David Flatt, Note, The Expanding Liability of Design Professionals,
20MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 611,615-19 (1990); see also Note, ArchitecturalMalpractice:A ContractBased Approach, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1075, 1075-83 (1979).
60. See Coombs v. Beede, 36 A. 104, 104-05 (Me. 1896).
61. See, e.g., City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. 1974) (citing Cowles
v. City of Minneapolis, 151 N.W. 184 (Minn. 1915)).
62. See, e.g., Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc.,
463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995).
63. See id. The underlying legal analysis involved has deep roots. See Rich v. N.Y. Cent. &
Hudson River R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882) ("In such cases the tort is dependent upon, while
at the same time independent of the contract; for if the latter imposes a legal duty upon a person,
the neglect of that duty may constitute a tort founded upon a contract.").
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relationship" that the contract creates. 64 In that manner, the courts conjured
a tort duty from a contractual relationship.65
It is not the result of the malpractice cases that is objectionable; rather,
it is that, by electing a tort approach, courts disregard the consensual
nature of the parties' relationship even though a logical and coherent
contract approach would produce the same result. At least with the benefit
of contract principles now well-established, who could quarrel with an
interpretation of a routine contract for professional design services that, in
the absence of express terms to the contrary, implies a term that the design
professional must perform all professional services in accordance with the
prevailing standards of that profession? 66 Could the contracting parties
have contemplated anything less without saying so explicitly? The
situation presents an ideal case for using common sense to discern what a
contract means.67
In short, when design activities damage the design professional's client,
the existence of the agreement for the design services should normally take
the relationship out of the purview of tort law. But even one who accepts
this view may question the significance of a theoretical preference for a
contract analysis when a client sues over a design error. In such a case the
court should find a sufficient basis in either contract or tort to impose on
the design professional a duty to the client to adhere to the professional
standard of care.68 It makes no practical difference whether the duty arises
64. See, e.g., Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co., 463 S.E.2d at 88.
65. See id. at 89.
66. Under established contract principles, courts may supply essential terms by imposing
obligations of good faith and fair dealing upon the parties that the contracting parties omit.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Even when presented with an integrated
agreement, courts may admit evidence of a consistent additional term agreed to but not expressed
in the writing if the term is one that, under the circumstances, might naturally be omitted from the
writing. Id. § 216.
67. For a particularly apt analogy, see Gallagher v. Upper Darby Twp., 539 A.2d 463, 473
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). The court held that the jury could infer from the evidence that the
defendant plumber was contractually obligated to find and fix the source of the plaintiffs sewer
problem and not merely to install the new sewer line as specified by the express terms of the written
contract. Id. at 474.
68. Even if the design services contract includes exculpatory provisions, public policy
considerations governing the effect of those provisions may bind an architect or engineer to a
professional standard of care. Most jurisdictions enforce exculpatory clauses in contracts that
excuse ordinary negligence. See, e.g., Anunziatta v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 353,
357, 363 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (enforcing a provision in a pest extermination contract that limited the
homeowner's remedy to retreatment of the home); Fresh Cut, Inc. v. Fazli, 630 N.E.2d 575, 580
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding an exculpatory clause so long as it did not outweigh the state's
public policy of generally favoring the freedom to contract). Exculpatory clauses that purport to
excuse violations of safety regulations or gross negligence or to relieve a professional from liability
for malpractice, however, may be limited by public policy considerations. See Emory Univ. v.
Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903, 905 (Ga. 1981) (holding ineffective a contractual disclaimer
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2
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as a matter of private contract based on express' or implied" terms of the
agreement for design services, or is judicially imposed under a tort
analysis 7' based on public policy. Thus, in these situations, the substantive
question of whether to impose legal liability or not comes out the same
whether we apply tort law or contract law.72 As a result, perhaps the early
malpractice cases applying a tort standard to performance under a design
services contract may be understood on a purely pragmatic basis; at a time
when formalism exerted much power over contract, the concept of duty in
tort provided
a convenient and flexible option for courts to reach a logical
73
result.
This last observation may provide an explanation, if not ajustification,
for using tort principles to allocate design risks between contracting
parties. That is, up to some point in the development of the jurisprudence
of design liability, one may argue that the interesting theoretical questions
involved have no practical significance. Perhaps the tort system has
provided an adequate framework for allocating the most common risks of
design liability with results that do not differ significantly from what we
might expect from a contract approach. Whether the design activity causes
physical injury or some other type of damage to the client, tort and
contract analysis often will lead to the same substantive liability decision.
In other words, the tort concepts of duty and the professional standard of
care often conveniently approximate the implicit commercial expectations
of the contracting parties.
The significant differences between using tort or contract principles to
determine design liability appear in sharper relief when design activities
cause economic damage to someone other than the design professional's
client. In those situations, a tort law analysis might impose a duty of

purporting to relieve a dentist from liability for failure to exercise reasonable care); Hargis v. Baize,
168 S.W.3d 36, 40, 47 (Ky. 2005) (safety regulations); Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewelers Prot.
Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282, 283-84 (N.Y. 1993) (grossly negligent conduct). See generally 6
BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 19:52.62. In any event, courts developed the controlling
principles of design professional malpractice many years ago in cases uninfluenced by contractual
exculpatory clauses. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
69. See Follansbee Bros. Co. v. Garrett-Cromwell Eng'g Co., 48 Pa. Super. 183 (Super. Ct.
1911).
70. See Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs., 168 So. 2d 333, 335
(Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
71. See, e.g., Minn. Forest Prods. Inc. v. Ligna Mach., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 892, 915 (D.
Minn. 1998).
72. Procedural and remedial considerations are different matters. See, e.g., 3 BRUNER &
O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 9:5 (discussing, among other things, how characterizing a warranty
claim as based in contract or tort may affect such matters as the measure of damages, available
remedies, and the applicable statute of limitations).
73. See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in ContractLaw, in THE FALL AND RISE
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 61, 63-66 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).
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professional care, but the ultimate remedy for the damaged party may turn
on the court's decision whether or not to apply the economic loss rule,
which frequently bars recovery in tort for economic loss when the claim
does not also involve personal injury or property damage.74 Should the
owner's engineer be liable to the owner's contractor for damages caused
by negligent design and supervision?75 What damages may a project owner
recover from the builder's equipment supplier and the supplier's
76
installation subcontractor resulting from design defects in the equipment?
May a general contractor recover damages from the owner's engineer
because the engineer provided inaccurate documents upon which the
contractor relied for purposes of preparing its bid?7 7 The list of

74.

See generally LESLIE O'NEAL-COBLE ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DAMAGES AND REMEDIES

330-60 (W. Alexander Moseley ed., 2004) (exploring the economic loss rule as it applies to
defective construction products, the work of contractors, professional services, and negligent
misrepresentation); John J. Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin'sEconomic Loss Doctrine,2005
Wis. L. REv. 225 (discussing the economic loss doctrine in Wisconsin); Steven B. Lesser,
Economic Loss Doctrine and Its Impact Upon ConstructionClaims, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Aug.
1994, at 21 (exploring the scope and application of the economic loss doctrine in the construction
industry); Anthony L. Meagher & Michael P. O'Day, Who is Going to Payfor My Impact? A
Contractor'sAbility to Sue Third Partiesfor Purely Economic Loss, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall
2005, at 27 (discussing the economic loss rule "as applied to contractor claims against third-party
professionals"); Patricia H. Thompson & Christine Dean, ContinuedErosion of the Economic Loss
Rule in ConstructionLitigation By andAgainst Owners, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2005, at 36
(addressing "recent trends in judicial treatment of the [economic loss rule] as it pertains to
noncontractual claims for economic damages by and against owners") (footnote omitted); Emily
M. Usow, Redefining the ProfessionalService Contract: The Evolution and Deconstruction of
Florida'sEconomic Loss Rule, 8 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (1999) (considering the evolution of the
economic loss rule in Florida and how "the common law of negligence has been altered since the
inception of the economic loss rule"); Gary Ashman, Note, The Long and Winding Road of
Economic Loss Doctrine in Calloway v. City of Reno, 3 NEV. L.J. 167 (2002) (examining "the
Nevada Supreme Court's treatment of the economic loss doctrine in construction defect cases");
Jody Bedenbaugh, Comment, Liability ofDesign ProfessionalsforPurely Economic Loss in South
Carolina,53 S.C. L. REv. 701 (2002) (addressing "the liability of design professionals to third
parties with whom they are not in privity of contract"); Michael T. Terwilliger, Note, Economic
Loss in the Construction Context: Should Architects be Liable Forthe Commercial Expectations
of Contractors?,31 VAL. U. L. REV. 257 (1996) (arguing for the avoidance ofrecovery of economic
loss by contractors from architects).
75. See, e.g., Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc.,
463 S.E.2d 85, 88-89 (S.C. 1995) (finding a contractor's claim sufficient to withstand an engineer's
motion for summary judgment).
76. Cf Commercial Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664,666,670
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (finding in a case involving defective structural supports for a warehouse
refrigeration system designed by a contractor's supplier and installed by a company retained by the
supplier, that the evidence was sufficient to support strict liability and negligence claims by a
subsequent purchaser of the warehouse against the supplier and installation subcontractor, but not
against the general contractor, for physical damage to merchandise stored at the facility when the
system failed after completion of construction).
77. See IT Corp. v. Ecology & Envtl. Eng'g, P.C., 275 A.D.2d 958, 960 (N.Y. App. Div.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2

18

Circo: Contract
Theory
and
Contract Practice:
Allocating Design
Responsi
ALLOCATING
DESIGN
RESPONSIBILITY
IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY

possibilities goes on, as does the debate among tort scholars and
commentators.78 These situations are inevitably troubling when analyzed
in light of tort policy, and they question whether our jurisprudence of
construction design liability is mistakenly anchored in tort.
Shared-design practices provide an opportunity to reopen the question
whether it is better to rely primarily on the construct of tort or contract to
analyze design liability questions. Drawing on long-standing scholarly
inquiries into the essence as well as the relevance of contract, one might
identify several reasons to prefer tort over contract for allocating shareddesign liability. For example, the actual experience with shared design in
the construction industry may suggest that many participants in the design
process, like many of their business counterparts in general,7 9 will think it
unproductive to depend extensively on contracts to order the unruly and
unpredictable risks involved. Moreover, because contracts often allocate
the risks that may arise from the contractual relationship only partially or
imperfectly, tort principles of liability frequently will remain applicable to
disputes between the contracting parties.80 Additionally, if one concedes
that participants in a modem construction project often must rely
extensively on one another to act reasonably, then perhaps tort is the most
feasible construct for addressing design liability." Finally, are classical
distinctions between contract and tort merely part of the game that lawyers
and legal scholars play behind a fagade of ordered doctrine?8 2 In light of
these ruminations, it may be predictable that disputes attributable to the
special relationships that arise from shared-design
contracts will be
"reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort."', 8 3

2000) (denying recovery for alleged negligent misrepresentation because the parties were not in
privity of contract).
78. See sources cited supra note 74.
79. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REv. 55, 58 (1963).
80. For example, the theory of negligent representation often permits a contracting party to
assert a viable tort claim against the other contracting party based on extra-contractual allegations
relating to the subject matter of the contract. See, e.g., Vicon, Inc. v. CMI Corp., 657 F.2d 768,775
(5th Cir. 1981); Cocchiola Paving, Inc. v. Peterbilt of S. Conn., No. CV010168579S, 2003 WL
1227557, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); Maxey v. Quintana, 499 P.2d 356,359-60 (N.M. Ct. App.
1972).
81. For a discussion of using tort liability to enforce contractual obligations, see Randy E.
Barnett, ContractScholarshipand the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy,97 HARv. L. REv. 1223,
1241-45 (1984) (reviewing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982)).
82. See Stewart Macaulay, An EmpiricalView of Contract, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 465, 477.
83. GILMORE, supra note 37, at 87. By notoriously investigating the reported death of
contract more than a generation ago, Professor Grant Gilmore helped to assure that legal scholars
would continue a lively debate on the role and relevance of contract that abides to this day. See
generally A CoNTRAcTs ANTHOLOGY (Peter Linzer ed., 1989) (providing a selection of readings
on contract law); THE FAIL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)
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This opening reflection on the proper boundaries between tort and
contract does not presume to contribute to the literature on the relevance
and future of contract in contemporary jurisprudence. It has, instead, a far
more modest goal. It asks only whether a contract approach to liability for
shared design is a viable alternative to the tort approach and, if so, it
wonders how such an approach might differ from the contracting
conventions current in the industry. These are not idle questions; we can
confidently predict that those who invest their fortunes, careers, and
reputations in complex construction projects will continue to document
their commercial expectations in formal, detailed, written agreements,
even as they continue to embrace shared-design practices, without always
comprehensively addressing the liability implications. Yet, if the industry
as a whole does not significantly alter contracting conventions to account
for the peculiar relationships that shared design creates, experience shows
that courts will eventually invoke tort principles to identify and allocate
risks that the parties were content to ignore.84
Although the construction industry recognizes that shared-design
practices complicate questions of design liability,85 it has not developed
widely accepted contracting customs that address those complications in
a legally significant way. A popular industry form contract provides an
anecdotal example of this failure. The American Institute of Architects
promulgates a leading industry contract form used for projects that follow
the traditional project delivery system in which the owner contracts
separately for design and for construction.86 The latest revision of that
document added an express provision dealing with the shared-design
process, but it does little more than clarify that the overall project design
plans prepared by the owner's architect may instruct that some design will
be provided by the general contractor and its subcontractors and
suppliers. 87 The provision cryptically states that the owner and the owner's
architect may rely on the design provided by the contractor, yet the owner
and its architect must specify "all performance and design criteria that
such services must satisfy" and the owner's architect "will review, approve
or take other appropriate action on submittals" but only for the vaguely
"limited purpose of checking for conformance with information given and
the design concept expressed in the Contract Documents. 88 The provision

(exploring "the intellectual revival of freedom of contract").
84. See, e.g., City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. 1974).
85. See, e.g., Lunch, supra note 30, at 29; Potter, supra note 30, at 27; supra note 30, at 110.
86. American Institute of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, AIA
Document A201-1997, reprintedin JUSTIN SWEET, supra note 57, app.C, at C-2 (6th ed. 2000).
87. Id. § 3.12.10.
88. Id. For a more complete critique of the AIA provision, see Circo, supranote 22, at 212-
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woefully fails to recognize, let alone allocate, the numerous liability and
risk management issues that Part ll.D of this Article discusses. 89
As a matter of understanding social behavior, one must wonder why
those who engage in complex commercial relationships involving the high
risk of property and economic damage would not uniformly prefer to work
out these liability issues more fully themselves than to await the gavel.
More to the point, a practical lawyer counseling a client involved in a
shared-design project must wonder whether a comprehensive contract
approach could provide the best solution for everyone involved.
To illustrate, let us now consider directly how the law should allocate
liability for damage that may result from the shared-design processes
involved in our hypothetical. The jurisprudential preference to view design
liability as a branch of professional malpractice predicts that if something
goes awry in the design of the project's atrium or its security system,
courts will be prepared to distribute liability among several participants
based on concepts of duty and the professional standard of care. The
hypothetical focuses attention on the prospect of property damage or
economic loss, and the balance of this Article will consider only those
possibilities. This Article does not consider such matters as who should be
liable if design problems cause injury to a worker, a visitor to the
construction site, a passerby, or an occupant or user of the completed
project.9'
Even in this relatively simple hypothetical, multiple, complex, and
interdependent relationships among those who participate in the design
process seem certain to produce commercial risk allocation issues too
intricate for blanket tort-law solutions. For most possible problems that
design defects might cause, every relationship could produce multiple
theories to support claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, and defenses.
Consider, for example, how the project owner, the county, the project
architect, several of its engineering consultants, the prime contractor, the
security consultant, the atrium subcontractor, and the subcontractor's
engineering consultant all might be involved in design activities that lead
to costly delays for one or more other participants. Certainly every design
professional who plays any role in the process should know that several
other participants in the process will reasonably rely on the expectation
that each professional service will be performed in accordance with the
professional standard of care. That being so, which of several design

89. This is not to say that experienced construction lawyers routinely ignore the issues that
shared design presents. Rather, the point is that the current version of a contract form that has wide
acceptance in the industry largely overlooks the complications involved.
90. As already indicated, should these processes cause bodily or personal injury to any
person, resort to the tort system seems both unavoidable and desirable. See supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.
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professionals involved should have a duty to judge the propriety of the
division of design responsibility in the first place? Who should review the
services, advice, conclusions, recommendations, comments, and omissions
of whom? What standard of care should apply to non-professionals
involved in design activities?91 Who should coordinate one design with
another?92 Who should integrate all designs into the project as a whole?93
All these questions and more become material for further consideration
in Part lI.D. Whenever the parties to this complex process have the
foresight to allocate liability under these circumstances, the jurisprudence
of design liability should welcome their efforts. Indeed, the analysis that
follows suggests that considerations of judicial economy, commercial
reliance, and economic welfare all point in favor of a contract approach.
Perhaps this solution may even appeal to those who would insist that tort
law must be held in reserve to allocate liability when the parties fail to
anticipate specific circumstances. So it seems not only functionally
practical but also theoretically compelling to ask how the participants in
a shared-design project who are mindful of the legal duties that their
special relationships may impose on them might develop a suitable
contract regime to govern those duties.
D. Interdependent Commercial Perspectives
Our hypothetical project exemplifies the increasing use of trade
contractors, specialized consultants, and manufacturers to provide
specialty designs. Properly understood-that is, in light of considerations
already explored-these circumstances not only invite the project
participants and their lawyers to re-evaluate fundamental construction
contracting conventions, but they logically require that they do so. To
demonstrate why, this subsection analyzes the shared-design process from
the commercial perspectives of the major participants. What follows
merely projects one of several possible ways in which each participant
might analyze the design risks that the hypothetical project presents.
A transcendent theme emerges from this exercise: Shared design

91. See Gardiner Park Dev., LLC v. Matherly Land Surveying, Inc., Nos. 2003-CA-002017MR, 2003-CA-002048-MR, 2005 WL 991066, at *2-3, *4, *9-10 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005)
(involving the question of whether to apply the statute of limitations for professional malpractice
to a claim against a land surveyor).
92. See City ofPortsmouth v. Buro Happold Consulting Eng'rs, P.C., No. Civ.A.2:05CV341,
2005 WL 2009281, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2005) (involving the failure of an architect to
coordinate with consulting engineers regarding the design of certain structural elements).
93. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dormitory Auth., No. 04 Civ.5101(HB), 2005 WL
1177715,at*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,2005) (holding that a contract obligated the architect to integrate
into the design documents the work of the contractor and a subcontractor); Nicholson & Loup, Inc.
v. Carl E. Woodward, Inc., 596 So. 2d 374, 388-89 (La. Ct. App. 1992).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2

22

Circo: Contract
Theory
and
Contract Practice:
Allocating Design
Responsi
ALLOCATING
DESIGN
RESPONSIBILJTY
IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY

creates a series of highly interdependent commercial relationships, and it
does so whether or not the parties address those relationships adequately
in their contracts. In the process of developing that theme, this subsection
also implicitly asks whose interests the law will promote if the relevant
contracts provide incomplete answers. Each separate sketch in this
subsection discusses some of the fundamental interests and objectives that
may influence the negotiating positions and risk allocation strategies of a
specific participant. These considerations include economic, risk
management, and other fundamental business concerns that ultimately give
commercial substance to issues of legal liability.
As the discussion progressively considers the unique perspectives of
each participant, we begin to see why both theoretical and practical
considerations should eventually motivate these interdependent
participants to adapt customary contract arrangements to reflect the new
reality of shared-design responsibility.94 The ultimate judgment here is that
if those involved with shared-design processes fail to craft a coherent
contract approach to allocate and manage the risk of design liability among
all of the interdependent roles, the judiciary will certainly impose on them
a less efficacious risk allocation system. The judicial approach may be
guided either by the merciless application of the notion that contract
sanctity prevents reading terms into commercial contracts or, what seems
more likely, by an aggressive application of tort principles to the multiparty, interdependent relationships of a shared-design project.
This section deliberately treats legal questions as secondary because it
views specialty design primarily from commercial perspectives. This is
similar to the way that participants in the construction industry analyze
risk. They first seek to identify and evaluate risks within the context of
business objectives, and then to control or manage them in commercially
practical ways. Only after they arrive, at least tentatively, at suitable
business arrangements do they give to their lawyers the task of fitting
those arrangements into a legal framework. This is the rightful realm of
contract, and it is the reason that lawyers who draft complex commercial
contracts need to draw on their grasp of legal theory as well as their
knowledge of their clients' objectives.
Because the project owner normally initiates a project and makes the
ultimate decision whether and how to proceed, the discussion that follows
begins with an extended review of an owner's perspective, and then it
considers the perspectives of other participants in the process as they, in
a sense, react to the owner's objectives. This is not to say that these other
participants play only a passive role in the process. Rather, this approach
94. One could argue, however, that the construction industry does not create a commercially
reasonable environment for all parties to protect themselves efficiently or fairly through contract
negotiations. See Circo, supra note 22, at 232.
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simply recognizes how projects occur in the ordinary course of things.
Design professionals, builders, and others involved in the construction
process must evaluate the business opportunities and risks they face in
light of the nature of the project the owner wishes to build and the project
delivery system that the owner elects. To be sure, the owner's decisions
may rely extensively on input from design professionals, contractors,
manufacturers, suppliers, trade specialists, insurance advisors, and others.
In the end, however, it is the owner's business needs that define the
project, and it is the owner's decision to commit capital to the endeavor
that converts a project from a mere notion existing on paper to a structure
rising from the ground.
1. Private Developer
A commercial owner builds a project to serve a business purpose. For
an owner that is a real estate developer (as in the hypothetical), the
underlying objective is either to sell the completed project for a profit or
to own and operate it as a successful economic investment. This means
that projected economic returns must justify the costs of construction.
Thus, the developer must establish a reliable budget and must maintain
adequate controls over that budget. The developer's interests also focus
attention on the project completion schedule. Delays in completion
contribute significantly to cost overruns, and they also threaten to delay or
deny project revenues. Thus, cost and schedule always heavily influence
a developer's perspective on every aspect of the construction process.
The third essential consideration for every owner is sometimes thought
of as quality. More accurately, this third essential objective is that the
completed construction must be what the developer proposed to build.
This concept encompasses the nature, appearance, function, performance,
and quality of the completed project. For these purposes, the term "utility"
may better capture the concept. For some owners, such as residential
purchasers and even some commercial owner-occupants, aesthetic
concerns dominate this third component. But for commercial developers,
aesthetics is only one aspect of it. To produce revenue as planned, the
completed construction must serve its intended functions, and it must
perform as planned. It must support the specific operations proposed for
it, it must attract and satisfy the desired end-users or purchasers, and it
must meet maintenance and durability expectations.
These three components-budget, schedule, and quality or
utility-figure into nearly every decision the developer makes concerning
the construction process. 95 A decision that serves one of these objectives,
however, may detract from one or both of the others. For example, a

95. See Stover, supra note 21, § 3.01.
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contractual arrangement that assures timely completion may drive up
costs, force quality concessions, or both.
For much of the past century, commercial developers in the United
States have often relied on the traditional design-bid-build delivery system
to balance budget, schedule, and utility considerations.96 Under this
traditional approach, although the builder agrees to deliver to the owner a
finished project that includes all elements of the comprehensive plans and
that meets all of the design requirements, the builder will probably provide
only a small portion of the construction and other required services
directly through its own employees and facilities.97 The builder will
subcontract the balance of the work to specialized trade firms, suppliers,
and manufacturers.
Although the design-bid-build system is the traditional method for
commercial construction, its well known limitations have produced a
steady rise in the popularity of design-build construction, which combines
the design and construction responsibilities for an entire project.9"
Proponents of design-build argue that it is often a more efficient process,
that it eliminates tension between designer and builder, and that it provides
the owner with a single point of responsibility for the entire project. 9 Not
only can it produce direct cost savings by allowing design expertise and
construction experience to influence each other in the early stages, but also
it can shorten the total project completion schedule because it permits
construction to begin before many design details have been finalized." °
When used in its pure form, however, design-build eliminates the role the
design professional plays in the traditional system as the owner's
independent expert whose first function is to provide a complete project
design that dutifully gives expression to the owner's requirements and
whose secondary role is to represent the owner's interests during the
construction process. 101 In short, the traditional method may serve project
quality and utility better than it does budget and schedule, while designbuild may better protect the budget and schedule, but at the risk of
compromising the owner's control over project quality and utility."

96. See, e.g., 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 6:1-:4; SWEET, supra note 57,
§ 17.03; Stover, supra note 21, § 3.01.
97. See Stover, Constructionand Design Contracts,in CONSTRuCTrION LAW, supra note 21,
§ 3.01[2][a].
98. See SWEET, supra note 57, §§ 17.03 & 17.04.A.
99. See 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 6:15 & 6:22; Schenck, supra note 29, at
1-2 to -3; Stover, supra note 21, § 3.01[4][c].
100. See SWEET, supra note 57, § 17.04.B; Stover, supra note 21, § 3.01.
101. See 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 6:4; SWEET, supra note 57, § 17.04.F;
Stover, supra note 21, § 3.01[21[f].
102. See Stover, supra note 21, § 3.09[3]. This comparison will serve our purposes, although
it oversimplifies. For example, even though design-build may reduce the total project costs and
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To capture the strengths while avoiding the weaknesses of both designbid-build and design-build, projects may adopt a hybrid approach to
design, such as the hypothetical project uses. For our purposes, the main
function of the hypothetical is to provide a simple illustration of this
hybrid approach in a context that will help highlight the challenges of
allocating design liability in today's construction industry. In keeping with
the more traditional project delivery system, our developer elected to
entrust overall design and contract administration to a professional design
firm that is directly beholden to the developer and that should remain
relatively free of the conflicts of interest that a design-build firm faces.l°3
In this respect, the arrangement resembles the design-bid-build system. At
the same time, a desire for the greatest expertise delivered with efficiency
and economy encouraged the developer to rely on a specialty designer
retained and managed by the prime contractor for the detailed design of the
atrium. For this single but critical component of the project, the
arrangement resembles a design-build approach because a single entity
will take responsibility both to furnish the design services and the
construction services for the atrium. Additionally, negotiating realities
compelled the developer to rely on a consultant selected by the county to
design the security system for the entire project, which is another
relatively isolated but important project component."
Whenever a project owner elects to divide design responsibility in such
a manner, unless the specialty design is of limited scope and complexity,
the owner and the lead designer should carefully adjust the traditional
contracting structure to account for the specialty design features. Looking
at the question primarily from the developer's perspective, the key
objectives should be to enjoy the advantages offered by giving specialists
greater control over limited aspects of the project and at the same time to
preserve the quality control advantages of keeping overall project design
and contract administration under the authority of the developer's
architect.
An initial question the developer and its architect must address in this
situation concerns the extent to which the lead design firm will provide
services relating to the specialty designs. For this project, we may logically

completion time, the traditional system facilitates competitive bidding and may allow the owner
to establish a firm, reliable budget before entering into a contract for construction. See id.
§ 3.01l2][b] & [c].
103. See SWEET, supra note 57, at § 17.04.F.
104. In this respect, the project is similar to another common contractual arrangement in the
construction industry in which the owner enters into separate contracts for distinct components of
the work rather than obtaining all design services from a single designer and all construction
services from a general building contractor. JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3.10
(1997).
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assume that the developer will expect its architect to furnish to both of the
specialty designers certain design concepts and criteria necessary to
coordinate the specialty designs with other aspects of the project.
Moreover, if the developer itself has no project management capabilities,
the developer may want the lead architect to have sufficient involvement
with the specialty design to protect the integrity of the design process and
the developer's ultimate interests in achieving a quality project that is
completed on time and within budget. Thus, the terms of the contract
between the developer and the architectural firm serving as the lead
designer should define in detail the specific responsibilities of the
members of the developer's design team in relation to the specialty
components and the designers of those components.10 5
The developer's counsel should recognize that customary design
services contracts will not adequately serve these purposes. Traditional
construction contracting relationships, which assume that the owner's
architect will be responsible to the owner for all significant aspects of the
design, would leave a critical responsibility gap when applied to this
project. First, the developer and its architect will need to identify the
preliminary services the architect will provide in relation to the specialty
designs. Second, they will need to agree on the extent to which the
architect should be responsible for reviewing, approving, or taking other
action on design documents provided by the specialty designers. Third, the
developer will need to evaluate its relationships with those other than the
architect who have design responsibilities for the project.
Let us consider these three issues separately. Recall that one risk the
developer faces if it fails to address these concerns adequately by contract
is that a court may choose to resolve disputes simply by declining to read
into the contract any greater role for the architect in relation to the
specialty designs than the contract explicitly identifies.'06 It should provide
little comfort for the developer to learn from its trial counsel at a later date
that for any one or more of the issues highlighted below, a tort-minded
court might be persuaded to find a special relationship between the
developer and one or more of the design participants that could support a
negligence or professional malpractice claim.
Lead designer's preliminary services relating to specialty designs.
With respect to the atrium, will it be sufficient for the architect to note on
the drawings the location of the atrium and to add a notation such as
"atrium design by others?" That seems inadequate for a relatively complex
project that requires a coordinated design concept. At a minimum, the

105. As a corollary, the agreement should appropriately compensate the project architect for
the additional services and liability risks involved.
106. The introductory paragraphs of Part II.D, supra, develop this argument.
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developer's objectives might require the lead architect to provide
preliminary drawings that show the location, configuration, and general
appearance of the atrium, along with at least some additional details, such
as how the atrium will connect with each tower. Other related design by
the developer's architect may include selecting certain materials and colors
and possibly designing some aspects of the atrium's interior space. Even
if the parties do not mention design services of this kind in their contract,
the preliminary plans the architect prepares may include them.
At this stage, the developer and its counsel should have in mind several
fundamental issues to resolve in the architectural services contract. How
can the developer confirm that the preliminary design criteria or other data
furnished by the architect are sufficient to define and direct the specialty
designs? How can the developer even know whether the division of design
responsibility proposed by the architect's preliminary plans is appropriate?
Will the architect approve the specialty designers or at least advise the
developer about their design qualifications?
Lead designer's responsibilityfor specialty design documents. The
parties also should consider in detail how to divide responsibility between
the lead architect and the specialty designers for design documentation.
For example, will the security consultant provide wiring details that must
be submitted for building permit purposes? If so, will the architect's
electrical engineering consultant incorporate those designs into the final
electrical drawings that the electrical engineer signs and stamps? Will the
architect's electrical engineering consultant be responsible to confirm that
all wiring details comply with the applicable electrical code? Similarly,
will the structural engineering consultant retained by the developer's
architect confirm the structural integrity of the atrium or of certain
connections between the atrium and structural components of the towers?
Will the developer's architect retain final authority over these details, or
will the atrium subcontractor take charge of them? Who will be
responsible to confirm that the atrium design is consistent with the main
project design in the sense that points of connection and intersection do not
conflict, that various coordinated aspects are in fact coordinated, and that
the final atrium design is aesthetically complementary to the overall
project design? How will the parties resolve any relevant differences
between the lead architect and the specialty designer? May the lead
architect and its design team disclaim all responsibility for the final design
of the atrium and the security system without violating the applicable
standard of professional care, professional licensing standards, and
governing building codes? Even if responsibility for the specialty design
can be effectively separated from the balance of the project design, are
there any specialty design details that should be approved by the lead
design team for any reason? At a minimum, the situation cries out for a
detailed provision in the agreement between the developer and its architect
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2
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to address the process by which specialty design documents will be
submitted to the lead architect for review and comment.
Legal relationships between the developer and those furnishing
specialty designs. Dividing design responsibility between the lead design
team and the specialty designers is only the first step. To whatever extent
the specialty design services fall outside of the scope of services for which
the lead design team is responsible, the developer and its counsel should
also consider what contractual controls and legal remedies should be
available in connection with the specialty designs. Under the proposed
arrangement, the developer will not be party to the contract with the steel
fabricator who will furnish the critical design of the atrium, including its
structural support system, but the developer will have a contractual
relationship with the security consultant. To whom will the developer turn
if the atrium design services are not performed adequately?
Although each specialty designer's professional mission is to furnish
a design that serves the project owner's needs, customary contracting
practices call for each of the specialty designers to have a contract solely
with, and therefore to owe a contractual and professional duty solely to, its
immediate client. In the case of the atrium design, the client will be the
prime contractor who enters into a subcontract with the steel fabricator
who will in turn furnish the atrium design. In the case of the security
system, the client will be the developer, although the security system
consultant was selected by, and presumably will act in some respects on
behalf of, the county. The developer's agreement with the lead architect
may completely exclude or significantly limit the responsibility of the lead
design team for any of the specialty design. The developer's contract with
the prime contractor will presumably call for the prime contractor to
engage a design-build subcontractor for the atrium and to install all
security equipment and components in accordance with the security
consultant's design.
Under these circumstances, what contractual responsibility will the
prime contractor have for the specialty designs? The prime contract should
provide that the prime contractor's scope of work includes the detailed
design, the fabrication, and the installation of the atrium. In the
hypothetical project, the prime contractor will not function as a designbuild firm in the usual sense; except for the atrium design, the prime
contractor will construct the project in accordance with plans and
specifications provided by the developer. Perhaps the developer will be
able to negotiate a prime contract that imposes on the prime contractor
unconditional design-build responsibility for the atrium. Even if that is so,
in this situation, the prime contractor may not have the expertise to oversee
and coordinate the atrium design by the steel fabricator. Additionally, the
prime contractor will have no involvement with the security system
design.
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Will the developer have direct legal remedies against the subcontractor
who will design the atrium? Courts will not normally recognize third-party
beneficiary status in favor of a party such as the developer, who is merely
an incidental beneficiary of the contractual obligations of the atrium
subcontractor to the prime contractor. 0 7 To overcome that hurdle, as
specialty design practices gain prevalence, the routine preference of
sophisticated owners should be to require that all significant design
services contracts to which the owner is not a party expressly grant to the
owner the status of an intended third-party beneficiary.
An experienced developer should readily appreciate the value of
securing third-party beneficiary status with respect to the contractual
obligations of the specialty design professionals."'s Although this tactic is
foreign to the contracting models customary in the industry, it may well
prove acceptable to all of the affected participants. Indeed, it is consistent
with the legitimate expectations of the parties and the economic reality that
the prime contractor is being paid to facilitate, coordinate, and administer
the specialty design process for the benefit of the developer, while the
specialty designers are being retained to provide a proper design for the
benefit of multiple parties.
The developer also should be concerned about the extent to which each
of the specialty designers will be obligated to maintain professional
liability insurance that will cover damages the developer may incur as the
result of errors or omissions in the specialty designs. As a result, the
developer should seek, and should ultimately be prepared to bear any
additional costs for, insurance programs to cover the unique risks inherent
in divided design responsibility. Owners relying on specialty designers
should recognize that professional liability insurance provided by the lead
design firm alone is inadequate to protect against the risk of design errors
and omissions when the lead firm does not assume full responsibility for
all aspects of the design.
The developer also might look to such additional protections as
performance guarantees from specialty trades and performance bonds
issued by sureties for the prime contractor or the specialty trades. Such
coverages will protect against loss from design problems that disappoint
the performance expectations for the project whether or not those problems

107. See, e.g., Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 392-93 (S.D.
Iowa 1973); see alsoSWEET, supra note 57, § 14.08.B (discussing "claims by third parties... based
on the assertion that the claimants are intended beneficiaries of contracts to which they are not
parties").
108. For a suggested contract provision that grants to the owner status as a direct third-party
beneficiary of a design-builder's contract with an independent design professional, see Susan R.
Brooke, Protecting Design-Builder with Appropriate Contract Clauses, in DESIGN-BUILD
CoNTRAcrINo HANDBOOK, 297, 301 (Robert F. Cushman & Kathy Sperling Taub eds., 1992).
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emanate from professional malpractice. Owners will provide the market
demand that will motivate insurers and sureties to develop more
comprehensive insurance and bond products to comprehensively cover the
project-wide risks of design errors and omissions in projects in which
multiple parties share design responsibility.'°9
This overview of the developer's perspective frames most of the issues
that each major participant in the project must address in relation to the
specialty design aspects of the project. Before turning to the perspectives
of those who will furnish the design and construction for the hypothetical
project, let us consider how the owner's perspectives might be altered if
our hypothetical situation involved a public construction project.
2. Public Owner-an Aside
In the hypothetical, the county does not represent the developer's
public counterpart because the county is not contracting for construction
as a project owner. Instead, it will be a purchaser and end-user of a portion
of the project once it is completed. Our review of an owner's perspective,
however, would be incomplete without considering how a public owner
who contracts for construction might look at shared design. A public
owner arranging for design services shares a private developer's general
perspective on the design process. But several additional considerations,
peculiar to the public arena, also affect a public owner's contracting
posture. As an aside, this section explores how these similarities and
differences between the private developer and the public owner may affect
the public owner's approach to specialty design.
The most obvious similarities between the public owner's and the
private developer's perspectives on project design relate to the familiar trio
of budget, schedule, and utility. These factors often will influence a public
owner, as they do the private developer, to rely on a key design or project
management professional whose loyalty runs to the owner, even while the
owner seeks the efficiency offered by specialty designers. For these
reasons, the public owner is just as interested as the private developer is
in dividing design responsibility in a way that is efficient while leaving to
the owner a degree of input and control consistent with the owner's own
project management capacity. The public owner either may retain an
outside architect or engineer to serve in the lead design and project
administration role or it may rely on its own professional staff for that
purpose. Just as is true for the private developer, how the public owner
achieves the desired level of input and control often will depend on the
extent to which it has in-house design and construction expertise.
The public owner and the private developer also are equally interested
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in contractual arrangements that establish clear lines of responsibility and
that include adequate professional liability insurance to cover the risk of
design errors and omissions. This should lead to all the same questions for
the public project as those that arise in private ones. Who will establish the
design concepts and criteria for the specialty design? Who will coordinate
and integrate all aspects of the design? What action or response should be
required of the lead design team when a specialty designer submits data?
How will the specialty design arrangements affect the relationships
between the owner and each of the participants in the project who are
involved in any way with design services? The answers to these questions
may lead the public owner to consider the same type of adjustments
described in the preceding section concerning the more traditional
contractual arrangements between the owner and the other participants.
Thus, when a public owner considers how to address the specialty
design aspects of a project, it must take into account all of the fundamental
considerations that a private developer does. As already suggested,
however, the public owner's perspective also includes several factors
unique to the field of public contracts. First, every significant public
project involves the public purse, the public trust, and unpredictable
political factors. Public scrutiny of projects financed with government
funds means that every public agency and official involved with
construction activities is a target for criticism. 0 These considerations may
motivate public officials and contracting officers to allocate design
responsibility more conservatively than is common for their counterparts
in the private sector.'11 This conservative approach may cause the public
owner to be more willing to bear additional costs for specialty design
review and coordination by a design professional beholden solely to the
owner. Alternatively, it may make a public owner more eager to adopt a
contracting structure, such as a turnkey delivery method, 1 2 that vests all
responsibility for the project in a single contracting party who will not
have the option to point an accusing finger at another participant in the

110. See Gene Ming Lee, Note, A Case for Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65
FoRt)HAM L. REV. 1075, 1075-76 (1996).
111. Cf id. at 1103-05 (noting that while a public owner may seek the same efficiencies
private owners seek, the government "must remain primarily concerned with its accountability to
the people").
112. The term "turnkey" has multiple meanings in the construction industry, but generally
refers to a project in which the builder agrees to deliver a completed building that meets the
owner's requirements under a contract arrangement in which the builder retains all financial
obligations and risks of ownership, design, and construction until the project is finished, at which
time the purchaser pays the entire contract price and takes possession. If the turnkey builder
materially defaults on its contract obligation, the purchaser, who has little or no investment in the
project, may refuse to complete the transaction. See SWEET, supra note 104, § 3.12.
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process." 3 It also should encourage the public owner to seek
comprehensive insurance coverage against the risk of design defects and
professional malpractice.
What is at least as important is that specific legal requirements
applicable uniquely to public projects may alter the contracting
environment for the public owner. For example, statutes, ordinances, or
regulations may require or encourage competitive advertising or bidding
procedures, public works bonds," 4 preferential treatment for local
contractors, suppliers, and disadvantaged business enterprises, "'
affirmative action,' 6 and wage protection for workers." 7 They may also
dictate how the public owner must select design professionals." 8
Requirements of that nature may restrict the public owner's ability to use
design-build, construction management, and other alternative project
delivery systems. 1"' Finally, legal controls also may encourage or require
specific contract procedures and provisions on matters ranging from
changes in the work to dispute resolution processes.'E
For the sake of simplicity, the structure of our hypothetical project
illustrates one approach by which a public owner might sidestep some of
these special considerations. By contracting with the private developer for
the judicial center on a turnkey delivery basis, the county has allocated to
the developer many of the key risks of the project.' 2 ' Assuming that the

113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 270a-270d (2000) (setting forth bonding
requirements for federal projects). State or local law often imposes similar bonding requirements.
See generally 3 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 8:155. See John H. Rains IV, Comment,
ConstructionLaw: Enforcing the Notice andFiling Time Requirements ofFlorida's"Little Miller
Act"-An Adventure in Statutory Construction, 58 FLA. L. REv. 425,427 (2006).
115. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,205 (1995) (considering the
constitutionality of a federal program designed to award highway construction projects to
disadvantaged businesses).
116. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (considering
the constitutionality of a city plan requiring "prime contractors to whom the city awarded
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one or
more Minority Business Enterprises").
117. See, e.g., Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (2000) (setting forth the prevailing wage
requirement for federal projects); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (upholding California's prevailing wage requirements against
a challenge based on the federal preemption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000)).
118. See, e.g., Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. § 544 (2000) (setting forth requirements for federal
design contracts); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 4525-4529.5 (West 1995).
119. See Sloan v. Greenville County, 590 S.E.2d 338, 355-56 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
120. For example, Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, known as the Federal
Acquisition Regulations, or FAR, imposes comprehensive requirements for many projects funded
by federal agencies. 48 C.F.R. § 1.000 (2005).
121. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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county has sufficient bargaining leverage, it may negotiate a firm purchase
price for the completed judicial center that meets objective standards and
criteria incorporated into its contract with the developer. This method will
be especially protective for the county if the contract conditions payment
to the developer on a satisfactory inspection of the completed construction
by the county's contracting officer and other inspection consultants.
At the same time that the county places most of the design and
construction responsibility on the developer, the hypothetical arrangement
provides for the security consultant designated by the county to design the
project's security system, which is of special importance to the county.
Depending on the laws and regulations that govern public works projects
in this jurisdiction, the county may be able to satisfy any competitive
bidding and other public works requirements in connection with its
arrangement with the developer and may be able to assure design of the
security system by the consultant of the county's choice by an indirect
process that is subject to much less public regulation or scrutiny. This
could be especially true if the bulk of the security consultant's work and
fees can be absorbed into the developer's contract with the county.
Even in this arrangement, however, the county may not be satisfied to
look solely to the developer to be responsible for design or construction
defects and warranty obligations. Logically, we would expect the county
to try to negotiate an all-inclusive construction warranty from the
developer, and it should propose that the developer assign to the county
certain warranties provided to the developer by trade contractors,
suppliers, and manufacturers. Also, if the county is concerned because it
has no contractual relationship with the security consultant for the final
design of the security system, the county might seek third-party
beneficiary rights under the contract between the developer and the
security consultant. Additionally, the county might also have its own
contract with the security consultant for preliminary services that provides
additional remedies against design defects and professional malpractice. 2 '

122. Public procurement statutes and regulations may actually encourage reliance on designbuild subcontracting in public projects. If a public owner wishes to secure a specialty design from
a design professional other than the lead design firm, a specification in the bidding documents for
a design-build subcontract will allow the specialty design to be included within the scope of the
general contract pursuant to the same public bidding process or other procurement procedure used
to award the general contract rather than pursuant to a separate process required to retain a second
design professional for the project. Cf. Kenneth M. Roberts & Nancy C. Smith, Design-Build
Contracts Under State and Local ProcurementLaws, 25 PuB. CONT. L.J. 645, 646-48 (1996).
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3. Lead Design Professional
Architects and engineers who provide project design services are
motivated both by business and by professional considerations. Design
professionals typically provide services for a fee based directly or
indirectly on the amount of time and resources the project requires. 2 3 They
rarely accept investment or liability risks associated with a project except
for liability risks stemming from professional errors and omissions. 24
Additionally, design professionals often place a high value on aesthetic
considerations, and they know that each project will contribute to or
detract from their professional reputations. In short, the lead design firm
for a project probably will be eager to provide, for appropriate
compensation, professional services for which it is qualified, and it should
seek a level of participation in the project that is at least sufficient to
promote and protect its professional interests and its reputation. But it
should avoid assuming risks that it cannot control through the exercise of
its expertise in providing professional services.'2
In many projects, including our hypothetical, the owner's architect may
be best suited to assure the orderly, efficient, and economical allocation of
responsibility for certain specialty designs and to coordinate the specialty
design services. We might easily imagine that for this project the architect
may have initiated the idea to omit the atrium design from the main design
services contract so that it could be handled more efficiently by a specialty
firm not under the direct control of the architect. Even under those
circumstances, however, note that the tort system would impose on the
26
lead architect some limited duties relating to the specialty designs.'
Arguably, by the mere act of recommending or approving a division of
design services, the lead architect implicitly makes a representation to the
owner that the proposed division of responsibility is professionally
sound.127 Even when the proposal comes from the owner or, as in the case
of the security system for our project, from a third party, the project
architect probably will choose to advise the owner on the feasibility of the
123. See SwEET, supra note 57, § 11.04.A-B.
124. See id. § 15.03. For a consideration of the specialized role of a construction manager or
project manager who might, to a greater or lesser extent, assume responsibility that crosses the
traditional liability boundaries for design professionals and constructors, see id. § 17.04.
125. Professor Sweet provides a helpful overview of risk management considerations most
relevant to design professionals. See id. §§ 15,01-.05.
126. "Architects and engineers must render whatever services they agree to perform in a
competent manner conforming to the applicable standard of care." 5 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra
note 23, § 17:39.
127. For example, design professionals face the risk of liability under a negligent
misrepresentation theory in a variety of circumstances. See Aliberti, LaRochelle & Hodson Eng'g
Corp. v. F.D.I.C., 844 F. Supp. 832, 844, 845-46 (D. Me. 1994); Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist.
v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91, 91-92, 95 (N.Y. 1989).
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idea and also probably will need to address design coordination issues that
divided design responsibility presents.
Up to this point, this review of competing perspectives on the specialty
design process has largely sidestepped the considerations of legal theory
with which this Part began. But at this stage, legal theory forces itself
directly back into the discussion. In projects involving specialty designs,
tort law considerations should give the lead architectural or engineering
firm a strong incentive to assure that its design services contract and the
other relevant contract documents properly delineate the scope of the lead
designer's responsibility in relation to specialty design services provided
independently by others. The hypothetical project architect should be
especially careful not to assume liability for design services performed by
anyone other than the architect's own personnel and the consultants it
retains. This concern may lead the project architect to propose express
disclaimers of professional responsibility for the quality of specialty
design as well as for the completion and timely performance of the
specialty design services. 28
The contract for the architect's services also should address what role,
if any, the architect will have in selecting or approving specialty designers.
While the owner may wish to rely on the architect's review of the specialty
designer's qualifications, the architect may take the position that it should
not perform that role for the very reasons that it is excluding the specialty
design from its design services contract. For reasons already explored, the
tort system also will impose some level of duty on the architect relating to
the security system design even though it was the owner, rather than the
architect,129 who proposed the specialty design arrangements for the
project.
The architect also should consider the extent to which it should have
remedies against the project participants who play a role in the specialty
designs. The architect may be limited to its contractual remedies against
the developer. To a significant extent, this is so both because courts may
be reluctant to impose any tort duty of care on other project participants
for the protection of the architect and because any tort duty established
may be subject to the remedial restrictions of the economic loss
doctrine.13
Another important consideration is that the owner's design firm may
confront a conflict of interest in determining the extent of its own scope of
responsibility. 3 As specialized design gains further popularity and

128.
context).
129.
130.
131.

See

SWEET,

supra note 57, § 12.08.C (discussing liability avoidance in the submittal

See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
Architects and engineers have recognized since the industrial revolution the professional
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acceptance, project architects may be tempted to assign high-risk design
responsibilities to specialty designers and to disclaim all responsibility
relating to the specialty designs. In fact, one might speculate that just such
concerns could motivate a risk-adverse design firm to propose assigning
to others complete responsibility for our hypothetical project's unique
atrium feature. Similar considerations might tempt the lead design firm to
perceive the county's proposal to use a specific security consultant as an
invitation to recommend that the developer should retain that consultant
directly as an alternative to the more conventional approach in which the
all design services and then retains
owner's architect contracts to provide
132
consultants.
as
designers
specialty
In contrast to the architect's position, counsel for the developer
probably will argue that the architect should accept more expansive
project-wide design responsibility. At a minimum, a project architect who
recommends securing certain design services through a specialty trade or
separate consultant should prepare project design documents that establish
appropriate design requirements and procedures. In the hypothetical
project, this may mean that the owner's architect will prepare preliminary
drawings for the atrium that establish many of its important features,
perhaps including its footprint, appearance, and essential functionality.
The architect also may establish and administer design submittal
procedures for both the atrium designer and the security consultant to
follow. These procedures might specify what drawings and other design
documents for the specialty designers must be prepared, what design
documents must be sealed by licensed design professionals, when initial
plans must be submitted, and how those plans will be coordinated with
and then finalized and incorporated into the construction
related designs
133
documents.
Counsel for the architect may respond with several important concerns.
The architect will not wish to assume liability for the design of the atrium
and the security system because the specialty designers are not being
retained as consultants to the architect. The architect and its consultants
will expect to review designs furnished by the specialty designers because
responsibility concerns that arise when the interests of the client conflict with the economic
interests of the designer. See Stover, supra note 21, § 3.01[2][a].
132. Concern about such risk-shifting may justify state intervention on behalf of consumers
in residential construction, but it should not justify similar action in the case of commercial
contracts.
133. Additionally, in keeping with the recognized special relationship between a design
professional and client, in a typical project, especially if the relevant contracts are silent on these
points, tort law should impose a duty on the lead design firm to exercise professionally sound
judgment in determining how to divide design among specialty trades and the lead design team and
in performing all other professional services assumed under the contract by the lead firm in relation
to specialty designs. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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the atrium and the security system will be integrated components of this
project. But for what purpose will the architect and its consultants review
the specialty designs, and what contractual obligations will the architect
and its consultants assume with respect to the specialty designs? Counsel
for the architect may object to any suggestion that the architect or its
consultants will review specialty designs for errors or approve them as
adequate or sufficient for their intended purposes. Perhaps the architect
and its consultants should only review specialty design documents to
confirm that they are consistent with the requirements contained in the
preliminary project design and to judge whether they are aesthetically
compatible with the design concept for the project.
The project architect and its consultants probably will agree to provide
services to coordinate the specialty designs with other design components
of the project because there will inevitably be points of physical and
functional overlap or interdependence. It may be difficult, however, to
define these services in precise contractual terms and to draw bright lines
of contractual responsibility and legal liability between the project design
services and specialty design services.
As always, the design firm should negotiate the contract for its services
with one eye on its insurance coverage.' 3' Many design firms routinely
seek contractual limits on liability, and most expect additional
compensation for the costs of special insurance coverage the owner or the
project may require.'35 Many firms also aggressively seek additional
compensation or liability exposure limits for any unique risks that the
contracting structure imposes, such as in the case of indemnities or
performance guarantees.' 3 6 Currently available professional liability
policies for design professionals cover negligence but not contractually
assumed liability for specific results.137 Consequently, design professionals
will be loath to enter into contracts that create contractual liability not
based on insurable negligence.
4. Specialty Designers
Those who provide specialty designs share some of the lead designer's
objectives and concerns relating to the scope and responsibility for design
services. In this respect, their negotiations with the prime contractor or
other participant who contracts for the specialty design services should

134. See SWEET, supra note 57, § 15.05 (discussing risk spreading in construction contracts).
135. See 5 BRUNER& O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 17:98.
136. See SWEET, supra note 57, § 13.01 (discussing compensation methods in construction
contracts).
137. See Ava J. Abramowitz, Professional Liability Insurance in the Design/Build Setting,
CONSTRUCT'ON LAW., Aug. 1995, at 3-4.
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reflect many of the same considerations as those that apply to the
negotiations between the lead design firm and the developer. They should
make certain that the contract documents clearly identify the scope of
services and functions that each design party will provide. In particular,
specialty designers should insist that the contract documents clearly and
consistently define the roles of each design party, including the
responsibility for establishing design criteria and any performance
standards, and that they provide adequate procedures for submitting and
finalizing the specialty design documents.
A specialty designer can control some of the economic and liability
risks it assumes by insisting that the owner and its lead design team furnish
adequate design criteria and other information necessary for performance
of the specialty design services. For example, the steel fabricator who will
design the atrium for our hypothetical project must rely on important
design parameters that the lead design team must furnish. This may
include area and configuration requirements for the atrium, information
concerning the points of connection and interface between the atrium and
other components of the project, details about mechanical, electrical, or
other systems for the project that may determine or affect related systems
for the atrium, specifications for certain materials to be used, and sufficient
criteria to establish the function of the atrium. In addition, if the atrium is
required to satisfy any design or performance specifications, the owner or
lead design team must provide those specifications clearly and in a timely
manner.
Specialty designers also should consider the processes the owner and
its lead design team will use to coordinate all design components for the
project and incorporate them into the project design, including the final
construction drawings for the project. Depending on the complexity of the
project and the specialty design, it may be important for the contracts
relating to specialty design to identify the preliminary drawings and design
documents that the specialty designer must submit to the lead design team,
the schedule for submissions, and the timing of any comments, approvals,
or other actions from the owner or the lead design team. Will objective
criteria govern the process for approval or acceptance of submissions from
the specialty designer? Should there be any controls to prevent the owner
or the lead design team from requiring unwarranted, unreasonable, or
excessive changes to the specialty design?
The specialty design firms also will look for ways to control and limit
their liability. In the first instance, a specialty designer would prefer to
have liability only to its direct client. In the hypothetical project, this
means that the steel fabricator would prefer to owe legal obligations only
to the prime contractor, and the security consultant would prefer its
obligations to run solely to the developer. This position, however, seems
untenable in light of contemporary shared-design practices. The atrium
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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design services for the hypothetical project, for example, are for the
primary benefit of the developer, not for the benefit of the prime
contractor. The security system design is as much for the benefit of the
county as it is for the developer. The fact that these specialty designs are
being obtained indirectly through contracts with other project participants
is largely a matter of efficiency and convenience. As a result, how strongly
can the specialty designers protest proposals, as the earlier discussion
suggests, that the specialty design contracts should at least expressly
recognize the developer (in the case of the atrium) and the county (in the
case of the security system) as third-party beneficiaries?
Even though the atrium subcontractor may be logically and practically
compelled to acknowledge responsibility to the developer, and the security
consultant may be equally compelled to acknowledge that it acts as much
for the benefit of the county as for the developer, they should still be
concerned about the possible liability exposure to other remote participants
in the process. For example, if a specialty designer fails to complete its
design in accordance with the agreed schedule, should the specialty
designer be liable to other participants in the process for resulting delays
and expenses?
The specialty designers will share the lead design firm's concerns about
the extent to which professional liability insurance policies will cover the
risks involved. The problems presented, however, may be more difficult
for the specialty designers. An architectural firm capable of serving the
lead design role for a project of this size may have relatively high
professional liability insurance limits and may be positioned to negotiate
favorable policy endorsements to enhance coverage. The steel fabricator
and, especially, the security consultant may be differently situated.
A specialty designer also should be concerned about the availability of
remedies against the architect and other project participants whose roles
and responsibilities relating to the specialty design may cause damage to
the specialty designer. The specialty designer faces the same potential
limits on its rights in relation to participants with whom it has no
contractual relationship as have already been discussed. 38 As a result of
all of these considerations, specialty designers may have significant
incentives to agree to multi-party agreements relating to the shared-design
process.

138. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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5. Prime Contractor
As a New York case demonstrates,1 39 the builder community will not
passively accept whatever design responsibility owners and their design
firms wish to impose on prime contractors and their subcontractors.140
Building contractors specialize in managing construction risks, such as
estimating and controlling labor and material costs, scheduling and
coordinating the work of separate trades, manufacturers, and suppliers, and
controlling the quality of workmanship.1 4 ' By trade and experience, they
are well-equipped to evaluate those risks and to establish fees based on the
nature and extent of the construction risks they assume by contract. 42
Design-build contractors receive a significant premium for assuming all
design risks of a project in addition to the normal construction risks. Prime
contractors not retained on a design-build basis will resist the extra risks
of specialty design unless they are fairly compensated and they believe
they can manage those risks.
There is now evidence that prime contractors are beginning to
recognize the additional risks they assume when owners and their design
firms provide for specialty designs to be furnished by the prime contractor
or through its subcontractors. 4 3 As the industry becomes more familiar
with the shift of specialty design responsibility to the construction team,
prime contractors will become even more sensitive to the additional costs
involved in arranging, monitoring and administering specialty design
subcontracts. Moreover, they will recognize the additional liability risks
they assume when the scope of work under the construction contract
includes design services. They will take these risks into account when they
submit bids or proposals and when they solicit proposals from the
specialty trades that will provide the specialty design services.
Prime contractors also will seek protection against these liabilities
through a variety of contract provisions. For example, they will negotiate
with owners for express design liability limits in projects in which they do
not so much provide the specialty design services as arrange for them as
an accommodation to the owner and the owner's design team. They also
will seek indemnification and insurance protections from the specialty
trades and specialty designers directly involved with the specialty design
process. These provisions may lead to increased subcontract costs that the
prime contractor will pass through to the owner in its bid or price proposal.
139. Gen. Bldg. Contractors of N.Y. State, Inc. v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 670 N.Y.S.2d 697
(Sup. Ct. 1997).
140. See id. at 698.
141. See generally 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supranote 23, §§ 7:23-:24, 7:26,7:29, 7:81-:88,
7:163-:170, 7:189-: 194, & 7:225-:227.
142. See Stover, supra note 21, § 3.01[2][d].
143. See, e.g., Okizaki, supra note 30, at 285-89.
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To the extent that they assume design liability, prime contractors will
attempt to secure professional liability insurance and pass those costs
through to the owner as well.
Prime contractors also must carefully consider whether any special
licensing requirements apply when they add design elements to an
otherwise traditional construction project. Licensing requirements vary
among jurisdictions in the manner in which they apply to firms that serve
both design and construction functions for a project, but most allow
design-build operations either expressly or implicitly so long as all design
services are provided by or under the supervision and control of properly
licensed professionals. 144 Prime contractors who enter into contracts that
require trade contractors to supply specialty designs must determine
whether the inclusion of what amounts to design-build responsibility
within the scope of the prime contract creates licensing or other regulatory
issues not involved in a traditional design-bid-build project.
If the prime contractor itself has little or no design expertise and is
merely arranging for specialty design services to be provided by specialty
trades to the owner and the owner's design team, the contract with the
owner should reflect that limited role. Among other things, this means that
the prime contract should state clearly whether the contractor's customary
warranty for work free from defects and the customary indemnity covering
the contractor's performance include the design services embedded in the
specialty design features. The contract also should resolve whether and to
what extent the owner will have contract rights against the specialty
designers. Negotiations on these points seem likely to lead to provisions
that give the prime contractor significant protection against liability for
design defects in exchange for the requirement that the prime contractor
must secure for the owner or other ultimate users express third-party
beneficiary status in all specialty design agreements.
Under these circumstances, one might expect the lawyer negotiating on
behalf of the prime contractor in our hypothetical project to press for
contractual terms that limit or disclaim design liability. The prime
contractor is not serving in this situation as a design-build contractor,
presumably has no expertise in atrium design or security systems, and is
not well positioned to control those design risks. The prime contractor
merely is better positioned than any of the other participants to arrange for
the specialized atrium design and to coordinate the installation of the
security system because of its working relationships with the trade
contractors and its experience and administrative capability and
contractual authority to coordinate the work and schedules of the different
144. See generally State-By-State Guide to Architect, Engineer, and Contractor Licensing
(Stephen G. Walker et al. eds., 1999) (summarizing specific design-build licensing requirements
that apply from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
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trades. To the extent this is so, the prime contractor may resist accepting
contractual liability for design risk, and may be even less willing to
warrant against design defects.
This analysis may change if the prime contractor receives a premium
for assuming design risk in addition to a normal general contractor's fee.
Even in that case, the prime contractor may be reluctant to provide to the
owner of the hypothetical project a warranty against design defects and
errors in the atrium if the steel fabricator assumes liability for design
matters solely based on the traditional professional standard of care, and
the prime contractor is even less likely to agree to assume any
responsibility for the security system design, which is being provided by
a consultant retained by the developer.' 45
6. Subcontractors and Specialty Trades
Trade contractors who enter into subcontracts that include specialty
design services should (at least in theory) price their services to include the
extra costs and liability risks involved. Additionally, subcontractors share
many of the prime contractor's concerns, especially with regard to whether
the customary warranty of work and indemnity provisions of construction
contracts include design services.
Those who provide the specialty design services through consultants
rather than properly licensed employees must determine whether any
special licensing requirements apply and how they can limit or adequately
insure against whatever design liability they assume.' 46 Specialty
subcontractors that provide specialty design details through the services of
in-house engineering personnel must determine what activities constitute
the practice of engineering or another regulated profession and must
arrange for properly licensed design professionals to prepare design
documents to the extent required by applicable law or the contract
documents. A subcontractor or specialty firm that provides design services
either through its own employees or by retaining design consultants must
carefully evaluate the availability and sufficiency of professional liability
insurance or other insurance coverage for design activities.147
Some subcontractors who possess little or no specialized design

145. The conventional doctrine is that by retaining the security consultant, the developer
implicitly warrants to the prime contractor that the security system design is adequate for the
purpose. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
146. Similar licensing and regulatory requirements also apply in the more limited case of shop
drawings submitted by the specialty trade, but under a design-build subcontract the design functions
involved are less likely to fall within any exception from the licensing requirements. See Steven
M. Siegfried & Stanley P. Sklar, ProtectingSubcontractorWith AppropriateContract Clauses,in
DESIGN-BUELD CONTRACTING HANDBOOK, supra note 108, § 12.2.
147. See infra Part II.D.7.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

43

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

knowledge will find themselves faced with specialty design responsibility
merely because they are positioned in the industry to arrange for the
specialty design or because they must contract with another subcontractor
or supplier or manufacturer who works directly with the specialty aspect
of the project. These subcontractors should evaluate their risks much the
same as the prime contractor does because they will see themselves as
arranging for design services as an accommodation to the owner and the
prime contractor. These subcontractors will look for the same express
liability limits and insurance and indemnity protections prime contractors
will seek.
In some instances, specialty subcontractors may lack the negotiating
position to secure sufficient protection of their legitimate interests except
through the efforts of the prime contractor who deals directly with the
owner. To the extent that is so, the specialty trades and their trade
associations may be more likely than other participants in the construction
and design process to lobby for governmental intervention to protect
against an industry development that they may view as being unfairly
forced upon them by design firms and large contractors with considerably
greater leverage. There may be some validity to this position, although it
is not necessarily different in character or significance from the
chronically weak bargaining position that certain specialty trades endure
in the marketplace.'48
7. Insurers
Insurers view coverage for construction industry risks from two
different perspectives. When presented with a claim under a policy, the
insurer may be primarily concerned with whether the claim is within the
coverage of the specific policy involved. This claims administration
perspective produces hotly contested coverage disputes that often turn on
microscopic analyses of policy provisions.' 49 The insurer's second
perspective stems from its broad business objective to provide valuable
risk management products to the industry based on sound underwriting and
pricing principles. 50 This second perspective is of greatest interest to this

148. See Stanley P. Sklar, Selecting the CorrectDelivery System and Negotiating the Right
Construction Contract,in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK § 11.07[B] (Robert F. Cushman &

James J. Myers eds., 1999) (discussing issues the contractor should consider when qualifying an
owner).
149. For a discussion of some of the most significant coverage issues for builders and design
professionals, see generally O'Connor, supra note 58 (discussing types of required insurance, types
of package coverage, and specific policies designed to cover specific risks).
150. See Gregg E. Bundschuh & David Collings, Insuranceand Bondingfor a Design/Build
Project, in DESIGN/BUILD DESKBOOK, supra note 29, at 4-1 (discussing several products the
insurance industry has developed to serve the special coverage needs of the design-build industry).
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discussion. The purpose here is not so much to determine whether
insurance policies issued without deliberate consideration of shared-design
practices happen to cover the unique risks involved; it is to inquire how
participants in the construction industry might use insurance to allocate
some of those risks. Moreover, this discussion is as much interested in
products that insurers might develop expressly for this purpose as it is in
the relevance and limitations of products currently available.
As shared-design practices achieve greater prominence and continue
to attract more intense scrutiny in the construction industry, insurers
should proactively review the risks they assume under policy forms in
current use. They also will, no doubt, assess the business opportunities for
providing coverage to contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and design
professionals involved in shared-design practices. Although insurance
coverage issues arising in the construction industry must always be
resolved based on a review of the specific policies maintained by each
insured party, some general observations will help frame several important
insurance issues presented by shared-design practices.
Three distinct types of insurance offered to the construction industry
are critically important to this discussion. They are public liability
insurance, professional liability insurance, and property insurance. For our
purposes, developments relating to the use of these policies in connection
with design-build projects often will prove useful to highlight insurance
issues that shared design also raises.' Those developments also suggest
the opportunity for innovative insurance solutions targeted at shareddesign practices.152
Public Liability Insurance. Commercial general liability (CGL)
insurance is the principal form of insurance to cover an insured against
liability for some of the most common risks of bodily injury and property
damage that the insured may cause unintentionally to others.5 3 A CGL
policy generally covers the insured's liability to third parties for bodily
injury to persons and for property damage if the injury or damage is
attributable to an "occurrence," a term that includes ordinary accidents. '
As is true with many other forms of insurance, CGL policies include
detailed affirmative coverage provisions affected by equally detailed and

151. See id. at 4-2.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 157-65, 173-80 & 192-203.
153. See Bruce H. Schoumacher, Risk Managementand Indemnity, in CONSTRUCTON LAW,
supra note 21, § 13.02[2].
154. See id. §§ 13.02[2], 13.02[9]. Although the meaning of "occurrence" may present
interesting issues, it is sufficient for our purposes to know that the term includes accidents of the
sort that cause unintentional bodily injury or property damage commonly arising from normal
construction activities and defects. See id. § 13.02[9].
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potentially complex exclusions from coverage.' Moreover, endorsements
frequently further modify the policies with respect to matters of special
application or concern for the industry or the specific insured involved,
and those endorsements may either expand or restrict coverage. Although
the coverage terms of a conventional CGL policy, when considered in
isolation, might extend to bodily injury or property damage caused by the
insured's design errors and omissions, polices issued to participants in the
construction industry typically reverse this result by expressly excluding
injury or damage from professional design services.IS6
In response to demand from builders, the insurance industry has
developed specific products to restore some coverage under a CGL policy
for the insured's design errors and omissions. As one commentary
explains, two endorsements in particular have been used for many
construction firms, including design-builders,
where coverage is required
5 7
for some level of design activities:
The first, "Exclusions-Contractors-Professional Liability
Endorsement" (Insurance Services Organization Form CG
2279), allows coverage for incidental design services
performed as a part of the means and methods of
construction, while excluding damages resulting from
professional design services. The second, "Limited
Exclusion-Contractor-Professional Liability Endorsement"
(Insurance Services Organization Form CG 22 80), allows
coverage for bodily injury or property damage from
professional design services in 5connection
with a project the
8
contractor is also constructing.
Endorsements of this nature to a CGL policy provide significant
additional insurance protection to builders who also participate in design
activities. They do not, however, fully protect the builder. One of the most
important limitations of a CGL policy as it relates to the insured's design
activities is that the policy only covers liability for bodily injury and
property damage. 5 9 Many damage claims relating to design services seek
recovery for purely economic loss,"6 such as schedule delays and the costs
of redesign services. A CGL policy does not extend to many claims of that

155. See id. § 13.0313] (discussing exclusions in commercial general liability policies).
156. Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-4.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See O'Connor, supra note 58. Bodily injury generally means physical bodily harm and
includes death, sickness, disease and, to some extent, mental anguish with bodily manifestations.
See Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.02[2][a].
160. See O'Connor, supra note 58.
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161

type.
Another relevant aspect of CGL insurance involves coverage for
contractually assumed liabilities. CGL policies issued to construction firms
commonly extend coverage to the insured's liability for contractual
162
indemnities, typically captured by the concept of "insured contracts.
Contractual liability coverage issued to builders, however, traditionally
excludes liability that an insured assumes under an indemnity in favor of
an architect, engineer, or surveyor for injury or damage arising from
common design activities.1 63 Similarly, CGL policies issued to design
professionals commonly exclude contractually assumed liability for injury
or damage attributable to the insured's professional services."64 Thus
design-builders must be careful to evaluate the extent to which broad
contractual indemnities that owners frequently propose for construction
contracts may be excluded from the builder's contractual liability
coverage. 165 Subcontractors and specialty firms that provide design
services along with construction, fabrication, or installation work have the
same concerns.
As the discussion to this point shows, with proper attention to detail,
our hypothetical prime contractor and the affected subcontractors might
have or secure CGL policies that offer significant protection against their
risk of design liability to third parties, but their CGL policies alone will
not cover all risks arising from their involvement in the design process.
The expanded role of subcontractors and others who combine
responsibility for design and construction services should create additional
demand for enhanced CGL coverage for shared-design projects, as well as
caution about the limitations of a CGL policy in relation to design
activities.
Professional Liability Insurance. Architects' and engineers'
professional liability policies insure risks most directly associated with
design malpractice." These policies primarily cover liability for damages
caused to others and arising from the insured's professional negligence in
rendering design services. 167 Although the policies cover the most common
claims for professional malpractice, coverage may be limited to
168
professional services listed by the insured in the policy application.
Moreover, some policies exclude coverage for services that are "not

161. See Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.02[2].
162. See id. § 13.0213][b].
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-4 to -6.
166. See Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.06.
167. See id.
168.bySee
§ 13.06[1].
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customary or usual" for the insured's profession. 69 Such an exclusion may
present difficult questions when a design professional is involved in
shared-design services. In the hypothetical project, for example, it may not
be clear what effect this exclusion may have when the lead architect
participates in decisions about the extent to which design components
should be assigned to specialty firms or consultants, or when the
engineering consultant who designs a specialty component for the steel
fabricator or the security firm participates in the process of integrating
those plans into the overall project design. 7 °
Other exclusions of potential significance in our hypothetical include
those relating to warranties and guaranties, estimates of cost, quality or
time of completion, joint venture activities, indemnity obligations of the
insured, and the failure to complete work in a timely manner, unless the
failure is due to professional negligence. 171 Some of these exclusions may
be especially relevant with
respect to professional design services provided
72
by specialty designers. 1
Although contractual liability insurance is available to architects and
engineers under professional liability policies, the coverage usually applies
only if the liability assumed by contract is a matter for which the design
professional otherwise would have been liable as a matter of professional
malpractice.173 Thus, a design professional will often be reluctant to give
an indemnity to the client except for the limited purpose of defending the
client against claims arising from the design professional's negligence in
providing professional services.
Limited forms of professional liability coverage are available to
contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers who are not directly involved in
the design professions. 17 Professional liability coverage also is available
to design-builders and design consultants, although several significant
questions arise concerning the extent of coverage the policies provide in

169. Id. § 13.06[4][e].
170. The exclusion could lead to several other questions in the hypothetical, especially in
connection with services, review, and recommendations by any one of the design professionals
involved in the process, beginning with the lead architect's decision to recommend or at least
implicitly accept the division of design responsibility in the first place, continuing with the selection
or tacit approval of specialty designers, and proceeding toward the final, integrated construction
plans. Among other things, several design professionals will be involved in the steps required to
coordinate the work of different design professionals, a process that may produce delay or lead to
unanticipated revisions or changes that cause delay or additional expense in related design and the
construction services by others.
171. See Schoumacher, supra note 153, §§ 13.06[4][a], [If],
[i], U] & [1].
172. See supra Part II.D.6.
173. Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-7.
174. See O'Connor, supra note 58; Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.06[9].
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a design-build context. 175 First, professional liability insurance generally
does not cover activities other than professional design services, which
may be defined as services normally provided by architects, engineers, and
surveyors.'76 Thus, in order to know whether professional liability
coverage applies, one must distinguish between construction activities and
design professional services. Second, the loss involved must be
attributable to professional negligence, such as the failure of the insured
to possess or exercise the degree of care that other professionals
177
performing similar services exercise under similar circumstances.
Performance that is erroneous, ineffective, or in breach of a contractual
duty does not necessarily constitute professional malpractice.178 These
factors may be especially important when the insured functions both in a
design role and a construction role, because the applicable contract may
include standards, warranties, or performance guarantees that create
contractual liability for unacceptable performance that is not
malpractice. 7 9 Additionally, the insurer may add exclusions to a
professional liability policy issued to a design-builder to exclude coverage
8
for such common claims as schedule delays or safety problems. 1
Property Insurance. Property insurance, commonly in the form of a
builder's risk policy, insures against accidental damage to the project
itself,' 8 ' which is a risk ordinarily excluded from a CGL policy except
182
when the insured caused the damage or is otherwise responsible for it.
A builder's risk policy covers damage to the building or project under
construction, along with related equipment, materials, and supplies, but it
does not cover damage to unrelated property.'83 These policies include
broad exclusions relating to faulty workmanship or design, but those
exclusions do not necessarily eliminate coverage to the extent that the
faulty workmanship or design results in an insured peril, such as fire, that
175. Bundschuh& Collings, supra note 150, at 4-7; Schoumacher, supranote 153, § 13.06[9].
176. See Schoumacher, supra note 153, §§ 13.06[1] & [4][e]. See generally Bundschuh &
Collings, supra note 150, at 4-7.
177. See, e.g., Bell Lavalin, Inc. v. Simcoe & Erie Gen. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that the engineer's professional liability policy did not cover damages attributable
to breach of contract); Robert L. Meyers, III et al., Risk Allocation From the Designer's
Perspective, 452 PLI/REAL 129, 133 (2000) (standard of care); Schoumacher, supra note 153,
§ 13.06 (standard of care).
178. See id.
179. See Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-7.
180. See id.
181. See Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.05[1].
182. A CGL policy only covers damage for which the insured is legally obligated. See City
of Scottsbluff v. Employers Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 704, 709-10 (Neb. 2003). See generally
Rowland H. Long, Commercial General Liability Insurance, in 2 THE LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 10.04 (2005).
183. See Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.05[31.
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damages the project.""
Either the owner or the builder may purchase the builder's risk policy
for a project.' 85 If the owner purchases the policy, the insurer that pays the
owner's claim for damage to the project attributable to the builder's fault
may seek to recover the loss from the builder by invoking policy
provisions under which the insurer is subrogated to the insured's claims
against any party who caused the loss.' 86 Builders commonly request
waivers of this right of subrogation. 187 A waiver of this type is even more
significant to a design-builder than it is to a conventional builder because
the insured owner may have a claim against the design-builder due either
to normal negligence in construction activities or to design errors and
omissions. 188
The above discussion shows that the net result of multiple, distinct
policies is that those involved in design-build projects face the risk of
significant gaps in insurance coverage. Some gaps may arise because
limited coverage and specific exclusions under different policies carried
by a single insured may leave some risks uncovered. Other gaps may exist
because some participants in the design process may carry significantly
lower policy limits than other participants or because one participant
inaccurately concludes that certain activities are adequately covered by
another participant's insurance policy. The latter situation may occur, for
example, when a design-builder who subcontracts the design work to an
architect or an engineer decides not to cover the risk of its own fault for
design activities because the design subcontractor maintains professional
liability insurance. 89 Still other gaps may exist because, while CGL
policies normally apply on an occurrence basis, meaning that a policy
applies if the occurrence that caused the injury or damage happened during
the policy term, professional liability policies normally are issued on a
claims-made basis, which means that the coverage applies only to claims
made during the term of the policy."9 The good news for those involved
in design-build projects is that the insurance industry has responded with

184. Id. § 13.05[6]. For example, if faulty installation work results in extensive water damage,
the builder's risk policy may be interpreted to cover the water damage. Id. § 13.05[6] & n.37.
Similarly, if a design defect weakens a wall, a builder's risk policy will not cover the costs of
repairing the wall, but if the wall were to collapse as a result of the same defect, the policy probably
would cover the costs of rebuilding the wall. See O'Connor, supra note 58.
185. See Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-8.
186. See, e.g., Rahr Malting Co. v. Climatic Control Co., 150 F.3d 835, 837 (8th Cir. 1998).
187. See 2 BRuNER&O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 5:231 (describing the scope or the general
conditions primary waiver of subrogation clause and other issues that arise regularly with the
primary waiver of subrogation clause).
188. Bundschuh, & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-8 to -9.
189. See id. at4-8.
190. 4 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 11:6.
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coverage options tailored to the needs of these projects.1 9'
One increasingly common insurance product that may prove especially
useful, both for avoiding gaps in coverage and for providing more
comprehensive coverage on a cost effective basis, is the consolidated or
controlled insurance program, sometimes referred to as a wrap-up
policy.1 92 These policies insure multiple participants in a construction
project and may be used for multiple risks.1 93 For example, a wrap-up
workers compensation policy may cover the general contractor and all or
most of the subcontractors working on a project.'" At least in some
situations, consolidated insurance programs may only prove feasible in
conjunction with large projects. 95 While wrap-up insurance policies may
be used to cover professional design malpractice, they do not seem to be
in common use for that purpose," % although a concept similar to wrap-up
insurance for professional liability coverage may in essence be available
under a different name.197 Because of the complexity involved in shareddesign practices, consolidated insurance programs may represent a
promising alternative for providing more comprehensive coverage for the
risks involved when multiple participants contribute to different
components of a project's design. It is too early, however, to know how
useful these programs may be.
The insurance industry has also developed other products that may be
of particular value for shared-design projects. Project professional liability
policies may be used to address some of the most significant limitations
of the customary professional liability policies.' 98 One of these limitations
is that architects' and engineers' professionally liability insurance policies
normally establish a single aggregate amount of coverage for the term of
the insurance.99 As a result, claims against the policy arising out of one

191. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
192. See 4 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 11:124.
193. See id.
194. See id. § 11:124n.4.1.
195. See id. § 11:124.
196. See Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-16 (discussing controlled insurance
programs as a device to provide workers' compensation, employer's liability, commercial general
liability, and builder's risk coverage only); Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.08[2], 13.08[3]
(describing wrap-up insurance programs as primarily used for general liability, workers'
compensation, and employers' liability purposes but noting the possibility of a program including
public liability insurance covering at least bodily injury and property damage arising out of
professional services); O'Connor, supra note 58, at 10 (discussing professional liability coverage
as one of the potential uses for controlled insurance programs).
197. It would seem that a project-specific professional liability policy may be structured to
achieve a result similar to a wrap-up insurance program. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying
text.
198. See Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-18 to -22; O'Connor, supra note 58.
199. Schoumacher, supra note 153, § 13.06[7].
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project may reduce the amount of insurance available for other projects.
By requiring a project professional liability policy, the project owner can
assure that the agreed limits of coverage will be available for claims
relating to that owner's project. When an owner obtains a project
professional liability policy it may be possible to cover multiple insureds
in a manner similar to the way a wrap-up insurance program covers
insureds for purposes of workers' compensation, employers' liability, and
public liability coverage. An alternative product more recently offered by
the insurance industry to address these problems is an owner's protective
errors and omissions policy that provides coverage to the owner for claims
in excess of the primary professional liability policy of the design firms
involved in the project. 2" Project professional liability policies and
owner's protective policies each have advantages and disadvantages that
owners must weigh carefully. 20 '
Based on the experience in the design-build industry, we should expect
that insurers will re-evaluate the insurance needs of their customers
involved in shared design, and that they will develop or modify available
insurance products to address the unique risks involved. Whatever
coverage is offered for shared-design errors and omissions will reflect the
insurer's underwriting practices and may lead to new or modified
exclusions from coverage for some policies. The availability of
professional design liability insurance for prime contractors,
subcontractors, and suppliers will directly affect the basis upon which
those participants in the design and construction process will agree to
accept design responsibility. The same considerations that will cause those
participating directly in a design-build subcontract process to reevaluate
their uninsured liability exposure should also encourage insurance carriers
to determine whether they can offer sound, new products to their
customers to insure the unique risks involved.
This leads to a final point about the dynamic relationship between the
changing demands in the construction industry for insurance coverage and
the emergence of new products in the fluid insurance marketplace. In fact,
because the insurance market responds to many variables, and insurers and
their insureds often negotiate special policy terms to meet unique
circumstances and needs, any general or static discussion of available
insurance products is necessarily incomplete and outdated.2 °2 The demand

200. See Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-18 to -22; O'Connor, supra note 58.
201. See Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-20 to -22.
202. See id.; O'Connor, supra note 58, at 10. Both of those articles repeatedly demonstrate that
some of the most interesting potential insurance solutions for design-build projects are still evolving
and that negotiations between the insurer and the insured often produce tailor-made policies or
endorsements. See Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-18 to -22: O'Connor, supra note
58, at 10.
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in the construction industry for specialized insurance coverage has
motivated the insurance industry to offer new products, and in turn, the
availability of those products has altered contract negotiations.2 3 To see
how this reciprocal relationship might be important to shared-design
practices, we can again turn to the experience in the design-build projects.
Astute owners now insist on design-build contract terms that require their
builders to maintain appropriate insurance to cover design activities.
Design-builders often respond to those requirements both by insisting on
contractual insurance requirements that reflect the specific coverage
available to them and by proposing contractual limits on their liability for
design defects that match the limits of their insurance coverage. The result
in these situations may be an insurance package carefully tailored to the
specific project and for which the project owner ultimately bears the costs
to the extent the agreed insurance requirements impose premiums on the
construction and design participants above what those participants pay for
their customary insurance coverage.
Similar results should follow as those involved with shared design and
their insurers work out coverage appropriate to each participant's design
role and risk exposure. In projects involving shared responsibility for
specialty design, contracting parties should begin to introduce more
specific requirements concerning who should insure which risks for whose
benefits. For example, when a trade firm will provide significant design
services under a subcontract with the prime contractor, the project owner
may insist that the prime contract specify the types and limits of insurance
that the subcontract must require of the specialty firm. In the hypothetical
project, the prime contractor might logically agree that it will require the
steel fabricator both to recognize the developer as a third-party beneficiary
of the atrium design services and to maintain appropriate professional
liability insurance. In exchange for including these provisions in the
subcontract, the prime contractor might secure the developer's agreement
to exclude any obligation on the prime contractor's part to furnish its own
professional liability insurance covering the atrium design and to limit the
prime contractor's liability for problems with that design. Such an
arrangement could avoid costly duplication of insurance coverage and
would allocate liability for the atrium design to the participant most able

203. An unusual example of this phenomenon is "project management protective liability"
insurance, which is expressly touted by a 1997 American Institute of Architects form contract in
a way that might suggest that a policy by this name has gained widespread acceptance. 2 BRUNER
& O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 5:218 & 7:16. In fact, it appears that only one insurance company
has offered a policy using that title, and there appears to be no evidence that the policy has achieved
any significant level of recognition in the construction industry. See id.; David R. Hendrick,
InsuranceLaw: Understandingthe Basics Regarding "AdditionalInsureds,"690 PLI/Lrr 591,64748 (Apr. 2003).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

53

614

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
58,REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 2

(Vol. 58

both to control and to insure that risk. This might be especially logical if
the prime contractor does not itself provide any professional design
services, employs no design professionals of its own, and has no special
qualifications to supervise the specialty design activities. In effect, as
participants in the construction process begin to appreciate more fully the
unique insurance requirements of a project dependent on shared
responsibility for specialty design, they will create a more sophisticated
demand for appropriate insurance coverage and a more coherent
contractual approach to allocating the risks of design problems.
8. Sureties
Sureties commonly issue bonds to back the performance of contractors,
subcontractors, and suppliers.2°" A performance bond in the construction
industry is the joint obligation of a surety and its principal, who is the
contractor or other party obligated to provide construction services, in
favor of the owner or other beneficiary of the bond.2 "° The principal and
its surety promise to pay up to the stated amount of the bond to the
beneficiary if the principal defaults in performance on the contract for
construction services. 2" A surety bond fundamentally differs from
insurance. Unlike an insurance policy that shifts a risk from the insured to
the insurer, a surety bond is the joint undertaking of the principal and the
surety exclusively for the financial protection of the beneficiary.2"7 By
separate agreement, the surety normally requires the principal, and often
those financially interested in the principal, to reimburse or indemnify the
surety for all payments made and expenses incurred under the bond.2"' In
effect, a surety bond is a secondary obligation that provides third-party
financial security to the beneficiary to protect against the principal's
default.
Because surety bonds normally impose liability based on contractual
204. See 4 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 12 (providing a comprehensive overview
of the history, use, and interpretation of surety bonds in the construction industry).
205. Id. § 12:2. The surety industry uses that stalwart example of legalese "obligee" to refer
to the person or entity in whose favor the bond is issued. See id. Perhaps the reader will forgive use
of the less conventional, but perfectly plain and apt, term "beneficiary."
206. See id. The discussion in the text is primarily concerned with performance bonds,
although in practice sureties typically issue a performance bond for a construction project in
combination with a payment bond, which assures that the principal will pay all those who provide
labor, material, and services as subcontractors, laborers, and suppliers under the prime contract. See
id. § 8:152.
207. Id. §§ 12:7, 12:9. Insurance companies or their affiliates, however, also are frequently
in the business of issuing surety bonds. Id. § 12:9.
208. See id. § 12:11. Absent an express indemnity or reimbursement agreement, the surety
may have an equitable right of indemnity against the principal jointly obligated on the bond. See
id. § 12:98.
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breach and not negligence, they are not necessarily appropriate to protect
against professional malpractice. Moreover, because surety bonds and the
underwriting techniques of sureties developed in the construction industry
specifically to assure performance by traditional construction firms, they
have not typically been issued to design firms. 2°9 As discussed below,
however, this does not mean that a surety bond cannot provide protection
for design problems attributable to the principal.
The surety industry has had relatively little experience with shareddesign projects. In the same way that we considered insurance for shared
design by examining developments in insurance for design-build, we may
gain some insights into how sureties may eventually react to the explosion
in shared design by reviewing bonding practices for the design-build
industry. The use of surety bonds in the context of design-build is itself
still in a relatively early stage, but there are significant signs that both the
construction industry and the surety industry favor the increased
availability of bonds to assure performance of design-build contracts.21
A threshold issue sometimes arises as to whether or not a bond issued
in connection with a design-build project in fact covers the principal's
design services as well as its construction obligations. In one case, the
court held, against the surety's argument to the contrary, that a surety who
issued a bond to a project owner on behalf of a design-builder was liable
up to the amount of the bond for damages caused by the differential
settlement of the building foundation that was attributable to design errors
committed by the builder's in-house architect and its engineering
consultant. t ' In another case, the court held that a county ordinance
governing bonding for public works projects required the county to secure
a bond in the full amount of a design-build contract, inclusive of the
portion of the contract price related to engineering services, quality
assurance, and program management.2 2
The surety industry is becoming more comfortable with the special
underwriting considerations involved in issuing bonds covering design-

209. Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-9 to -11.
210. See id. at 4-10 to -11,4-14 to -15; 4 BRUNER& O'Connor, supranote 23, §§ 12:83-12:95
(discussing various elements and risks that sureties consider when deciding whether to bond the
performance of a design-build contract); see also Philip L. Bruner, Design-BuildViewed from the
Surely's Perspective, CONSTRUCTION LAW., July 2000, at 17 (describing changes in "surety
industry attitudes toward bonding design-builders").
211. Nicholson & Loup, Inc. v. Carl E. Woodward, Inc., 596 So. 2d 374,379,389-90 (La. Ct.
App. 1992); cf. Herbert S. Newman & Partners, P.C. v. CFC Constr. Ltd. P'ship, 674 A.2d 1313,
1317 (Conn. 1996) (finding that an architect retained by a general contractor was entitled to recover
under the contractor's payment bond even though the statutory requirement for a payment bond
only protected those who provide labor and materials, and concluding that the terms of the bond
could be, and were, broader than the coverage that was required by statute).
212. Sloan v. Greenville County, 590 S.E.2d 338, 355-56 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).
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build contracts.21 3 One commentator notes that while sureties sometimes
agree to issue bonds to cover the full performance of a design-builder and
that the growing popularity of design-build may make that practice more
common in the future, many sureties are reluctant to do so. 2 14 The same
commentator gives the following example of a contract provision used
expressly for the purpose of confirming the understanding of the principal
and the beneficiary that the bond does not protect the beneficiary from
design errors by a design-builder:
The bond does not cover any responsibility for negligence,
errors or omissions in design, or warranty of design.
Coverage under the bond is limited to only the construction
phase and post-construction phase of the contract. The bond
premium is based only upon the value of the construction and
post-construction phase of the
215 contract and not upon the
design aspect of the contract.
Our hypothetical project illustrates some special problems that shareddesign projects present for bonding purposes. The prime contractor may
have a perfectly acceptable record for successfully completing projects of
similar size and complexity. It also may be a financially strong firm that
has a well-established relationship with a surety. Yet, will that surety be
willing to issue a performance bond for a contract that includes the design
of the atrium as well as the construction of the entire project? What
experience does the prime contractor have in furnishing or overseeing
design activities? What controls does it have over the steel fabricator? One
possible approach is for the prime contractor to require the steel fabricator
to provide a bond covering the design-build subcontract as financial
assurance to the prime contractor's surety.21 6
Also note that even if the prime contractor is able to secure a bond for
the hypothetical project that includes the atrium design, that bond would
not also cover the design of the security system because the security
consultant is not a subcontractor to the prime contractor. While the
security consultant might be able to furnish its own bond, that is not an

213. See Bruner, supra note 210, at 17-21 (discussing underwriting considerations in surety
bonds to apprise the design-builder and the surety of significant risks).
214. Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-10 to -11; see also Sheffield Assembly of
God Church, Inc. v. Am. Ins. Co., 870 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a
proposed design-build contract was divided by the parties' agreement into separate contracts for
construction and for architectural services and that the surety issued a bond to cover the
construction contract but refused to issue a bond to cover the design services agreement).
215. Bundschuh & Collings, supra note 150, at 4-10.
216. See id. at 4-15 (suggesting that when a joint venture between a builder and a design firm
seeks bonding, the builder member of the joint venture may be able to provide the bond).
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ideal option. First, it is still uncommon for sureties to issue performance
bonds for contracts solely for design services. While there is no reason that
a bond could not be issued on behalf of the security consultant, a
specialized design firm is even less likely than a lead design firm to have
the financial strength and record on bonded projects that a surety's
underwriting standards may require. Furthermore, the use of two bonds
issued by different sureties for discrete portions of the project will create
the risk that if the developer has a claim, each surety will raise a defense
based on the acts or omissions of the principal under the other bond.2 17
Arguably, the optimum solution for bonding the hypothetical project
might require that a surety issue a bond on a project basis. There are
situations in which the parties may be able to negotiate unique bond terms
tailored to the specific project, especially if the project is a large one and
the beneficiary has significant bargaining strength."' That prospect,
however, seems especially problematic for the hypothetical project
because of the difficulty the parties will face in satisfying the likely
underwriting standards. Without restructuring the arrangement
significantly, there is no single principal motivated to accept full
responsibility for the entire scope of services and work that would be
covered by the bond, nor is there any reason to expect that the prime
contractor, the security consultant, and the steel fabricator will agree to be
jointly and severally liable to the surety, or that it is practical for the
parties to apportion the indemnification or reimbursement arrangements
necessary to satisfy standard financial underwriting by the surety.
The experience of design-builders and their sureties may serve as a
prelude to the use of surety bonds issued expressly to cover the design as
well as the construction obligations of firms that provide design in
combination with specialty construction or installation services. Sureties
may, however, be extremely cautious in underwriting the risks involved.
In light of contemporary shared-design practices, sureties should review
the terms of a contract or subcontract proposed for bonding to determine
what design responsibility it purports to impose on the surety's principal.
A surety will be unlikely to issue a bond to assure performance under a
contract that imposes design responsibility if the principal does not have
217. As noted in other parts of this Article, the shared-design process inherently involves
complex relationships between multiple participants who play some role in the specialty design
process. See supra Part I.C. Even if the specific claim that arises relates solely to the security
system, the security consultant and its surety may be able to develop a defense based on the acts
and omissions of the prime contractor, one or more subcontractors, or the lead architect, all of
whom are in some way involved in reviewing, coordinating, integrating, or carrying out aspects of
the security system design. Cf. Thomas v. Smith, No. 3:03CV1398, 2004 WL 1969401, at *2, *5-6
(D. Conn. Sept. 3, 2004) (permitting an architect to seek apportionment of a design liability claim
among subcontractors who participated in the design).
218. by4 UF
BRUNER
& O'CONNOR,Repository,
supra note 23,
§ 12:20.
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a demonstrated record for successfully performing design services of the
type involved, does not completely control the design services, or lacks
sufficient financial resources to reimburse the surety for the consequences
of design errors.219 Large and complex projects that depend on shareddesign services, such as are involved in the hypothetical project, may
eventually provide a market for surety bonds that address the unique risks
of specialty design practices within the context of traditional project
delivery systems. 221
Il. CONTRACTS FOR DESIGN AND DESIGN FOR CONTRACTS

A. The Importance of PrivateRisk Allocation in the
ConstructionIndustry
With the interdependent relationships of shared design in mind,
consider the important social function that business contracts serve. They
provide a flexible framework by which business enterprises may allocate
commercial risks effectively, predictably, sensibly, and efficiently.22
There are at least three ways to explain how contracts serve these
purposes. The first stems from the legal enforceability of agreements:
Contract law provides meaningful legal remedies to back up commercial
bargains.222 The significance of this factor alone, however, may be limited
by the substantial costs associated with enforcing legal remedies through
the legal process. 223 The second factor is primarily a matter of the social
structure of the business community: A firm's reputation for honoring its
written commitments and its record for performing as promised affects the
firm's prospects for future success. 224 This second factor can at least
sometimes be a powerful force in the construction industry, where
reputations may be long-lived within the relevant marketplace, be it local,
regional, national, or international. 225 Developers, design professionals,
general contractors, trade contractors, and other participants in the
construction industry often must compete intensely for projects. The

219. See Bruner, supra note 210, at 17-18.
220. See Kenneth N. Ryan, BondingDesign-Build Contracts,in DESIGN-BUILDCONTRACTING
HANDBOOK, supra note 108, §§ 5:3, 5:7.
221. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts:A Philosophyof Complex Business
Transactions,54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1084-85 (2004).
222. The function of contract law in our society derives from the fact that it "in some way
recognizes [a contractual promise] as a duty." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1
(1981).
223. See Karen Eggleston et al., The Designandinterpretationof Contracts:Why Complexity
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 119-22 (2000).
224. See id. at 92.
225. Id. at 115-19.
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selection process, whether formal or informal, may place significant
weight on the firm's reputation and performance record.226
A third way in which formal business contracts function effectively and
efficiently to govern commerce is probably the most important factor to
consider for our purposes. Business contracts help those engaged in
complex commercial relationships to govern themselves, largely without
the coercive, costly, inefficient, and unreliable supervision of government
institutions.227 When serious commercial disputes arise, business people
pursue informal solutions, often in consultation with their lawyers,
accountants, insurers, financial consultants, and other advisors. To some
considerable extent, the informal process implicitly recognizes that courts,
arbitrators, and mediators will give meaningful deference to the rules set
out in formal, written contracts between the disputants. As a practical
matter, thoughtfully conceived, well-drafted, comprehensive business
contracts often are self-enforcing. This is one important reason why
businesses, including most participants in the construction industry,
routinely use detailed written agreements. The fact that a small proportion
of building construction disputes requires formal dispute resolution
confirms rather than belies the overriding effectiveness and social utility
of contract in the commercial world.228
A construction project provides an especially apt forum for a
comprehensive contractual approach to risk allocation. Design
professionals, general contractors, trade contractors, suppliers,
manufacturers, insurers, sureties, and others in the construction industry
all assume specific risks for fees. Short-term profit on any specific
construction project, and often long-term success in the industry, depends
on the participant's ability to predict the costs of performance, which in
turn requires a comprehensive and objective inventory of contractual
activities, responsibilities, and risks. 229 All participants can benefit by
routinely operating under contracts that reflect an economically-rational

226. This seems to be true to a significant extent in a wide variety of contexts. See Konefsky,
supra note 5, at 1182 (subcontracting firms); Michael W. Mutek, Implementation of Public-Private
Partnering,30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 557, 567 (2001) (government contractor); Charles M. O'Neil,
ProjectFinancing1989: PowerGeneration,Waste Recovery, and Other IndustrialFacilities,326
PLIREAL 299, 303 (1989) (contractor for power plant).
227. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641, 1692-93 (2003).
228. See generallyLipshaw, supra note 221 (examining contract theory and how lawyers deal
with contractual uncertainty through complex business transactions); Scott, supra note 227, at 1645
(arguing that "the observed preference for reciprocal fairness offers the best available solution
to... deliberately incomplete agreements").
229. 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 7:8-:12. Of course, some parties may not
have the bargaining position to benefit fully from a comprehensive contract approach. See Circo,
supra note 22, at 232.
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assessment of project risks and that assign specific activities and
responsibilities with considerable detail and precision.
One also must recognize, however, that it is unusually difficult to
identify in advance all the factors and conditions that might increase the
costs of performance on a particular construction project. There are several
reasons for this. Some factors, such as weather, the availability of adequate
supplies of labor and materials, and site conditions, often can be estimated
based on prior experience, but they cannot be completely managed or
controlled.23° Other factors, such as the extent to which any organizational
structure or project delivery system will succeed in coordinating the
interdependent activities of multiple participants, may involve too many
human and environmental variables to permit a high degree of
predictability. 3 Under these circumstances, when an unexpected problem
creates unanticipated costs or delays, the participants naturally construe
contractual gaps and ambiguities from conflicting perspectives. When the
contracts permit the view that the problem did not result from a
participant's own failure to perform, that participant will seek relief from
other participants. This is the raw material of claims and disputes.
Experience in the construction industry demonstrates the value of
careful planning prior to the time a project commences. 23 2 It is for this
reason that a conventional design process involves a series of planning
steps, each building on the other. Those steps may begin when an
architect, engineer, project manager, or other advisor assists the owner in
developing a detailed written description of the owner's objectives for the
project, including the business or organizational purposes to be served,
physical and functional requirements, and many other details. This
description then becomes the basis for conceptual drawings that must be
progressively particularized. The process typically includes several
opportunities for comments, questions, and suggestions from the
appropriate spokespersons on behalf of the owner's management or
operating divisions. It also may involve an extensive pre-construction
review or a midway-value engineering process exclusively introduced for
the purpose of identifying potential problems, cost-saving opportunities,
and design alternatives. That process may be led by a member of the
design team, a project manager, a representative of a building contractor,
an experienced employee or department of the owner, or one or more
consultants who will not otherwise be involved in the project. It is also
during the planning stages for a project that members and prospective
members of the design and construction teams may come together to begin
to establish working relationships and efficient processes for the project.
230. See 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 7:64-:88.
231. Id. § 7:64.
232. See id. § 7:23.
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The development of a carefully conceived, comprehensive contract
structure also should be an important part of the planning process.2 33
It is in part due to the advantages of comprehensive and coordinated
contract terms that certain segments of the construction industry have
come to rely extensively on form contracts promulgated by professional
and trade associations. These considerations also explain why many major
developers and companies that regularly have projects under construction
create their own standard sets of contract terms and conditions. These
forms and contracting conventions, however, also have disadvantages. In
some circumstances, they permit the parties to proceed even when they
have not adequately assessed and allocated the project risks presented by
special circumstances.234 More pertinent to the issue at hand, such forms
and conventions can also make it difficult for participants to perceive and
react appropriately to new developments in project delivery systems that
do not fall neatly into the existing patterns of contract structures. That
seems to be the current situation in at least certain segments of the industry
with respect to reliance on shared design.235
As discussed in detail in Part II, a project involving shared design
creates several unique risk factors and multiple interdependent
relationships that affect the distinct and conflicting objectives of different
participants.236 When we consider the potential reach of tort theory as an
imposed regime for allocating these risks, we see that shared design
increases the potential penalty to the participants for failing to allocate
foreseeable risks by contract. 23' For these reasons, effective and efficient
risk allocation for shared-design projects requires a comprehensive
contract approach.
Participants in a shared-design project could achieve this result by
following either one of two contrasting routes. One is to adapt the
traditional design-bid-build project delivery system to the special factors
involved in shared design. The other is to replace that project delivery
system with a new one that brings all, or at least many, of the major
project participants affected by shared design under an umbrella contract.
In some instances, the participants will decide to work within the
traditional project delivery system, which uses a series of independent,

233. An important distinction exists between developing the appropriate contract structures
and negotiating the actual contracts. In essence, the process of determining the contract structures
is the process of defining the project delivery system. This Article advances the argument that
shared-design practices signal the need to modify the traditional project delivery system or even
to develop a new one.
234. See 5 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 17:18.
235. See supra notes 22-30, 85-89 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part II.C.
237. See supra Part II.C.
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bilateral contracts. They may reach this decision primarily because the
extent or nature of the shared design is not significant enough for the
project as a whole to justify a radical departure from the traditional
structure. Alternatively, they simply may think it impractical to vary
conventional contracting practices significantly under the particular
circumstances they face. In these cases, the parties to each bilateral
contract should negotiate variations on customary contract terms to
account for the unique risks that shared design introduces into their
particular two-party relationship.
In other situations, the parties may see an opportunity for a projectwide approach. Especially in complex projects, the owner and its design
team should consider developing a project design participation agreement
that all major participants sign. The project participation agreement could
clarify matters of importance to many parties, such as to whom each
signing participant owes specific duties, which parties must provide
insurance for the protection of other participants, and any limits on
warranty, liability, or indemnity obligations.
The next subsection suggests a few contract adjustments that project
participants might use in traditional bilateral contracts to allocate some of
the special risks associated with shared-design responsibility. Part Il.C
explains the reasons for a far more comprehensive approach in the form
of a multi-party design-participation agreement.
B. Using Bilateral Contractsto Allocate Shared-DesignLiability
The following discussion draws on the analysis in Part II to explore a
few ways in which the participants in the hypothetical project might
address shared-design issues in their contracts without completely
revamping their contractual arrangements. The intention here is not to
recommend specific compromises or complete resolutions, even for the
limited circumstances of the hypothetical project. Rather, this brief
discussion merely illustrates how the parties might approach questions of
design liability for shared design within the traditional design-bid-build
project delivery system. Because of the number of variables involved,
many alternative compromises on the selected issues raised here are
possible. Part II already has provided the parameters for a host of potential
compromises that participants in a shared-design project might negotiate
in light of the unique circumstances of that project. Rather than attempting
to propose model compromise solutions for all of those issues, this Part
revisits a few selected issues to illustrate the potential and the limitations
of a bilateral contract approach.
Developer-ProjectArchitect Agreement
From the project architect's perspective, it is most important in our
hypothetical situation that the agreement expressly exclude the atrium and
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2
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security system designs from the architect's contractual scope of services.
The parties might easily accomplish this by including in the design
services agreement an exclusive list of the included design services that
expressly confirms the limited involvement of the architect in the specialty
designs. Adopting this approach, the parties might specify that the project
architect will provide only preliminary design information for the atrium
and limited information relating to the requirements for the security
system, while the owner will secure from others the detailed plans and
specifications for these aspects of the project. This approach is consistent
with that of a popular industry form contract for architectural services,
which allows the owner's architect to specify that the contractor must
furnish specialty design for which the architect merely provides
"appropriate performance and design criteria." 238
'
As has already been suggested in Part H1, however, it probably should
not be acceptable to either the architect or the developer simply to leave
matters there.239 First, one could legitimately inquire what precise
information is adequate as the "performance and design criteria." 24° At a
minimum, the parties might decide to describe in greater and more
objective detail what information and services the project architect will
provide relating to the atrium design. Second, legal counsel for both
parties should use the contract negotiations to identify and address any
inconsistencies in the assumptions and perspectives of their two clients
relating to the specialty design. This second point merits a more extensive
consideration of a selected issue that serves as an illustration. Perhaps
neither party will initially see any reason to address in the contract the
circumstances that account for the shared-design features of the project.
On closer analysis, however, doing so will serve both parties' interests.
If asked about the point, the developer might indicate a belief that these
circumstances reflect that the architect has a much broader responsibility
relating to the specialty designs than the architect believes it has assumed.
This could be especially true concerning the atrium because under the
stated facts the architect recommended to the developer that the
specialized nature of atrium design made it desirable to have the steel
fabricator serve as a design-build subcontractor. Based on that fact, the
developer might be tacitly relying on the architect for two important
matters concerning the atrium design, while at the same time the architect
might believe it has effectively disclaimed legal responsibility for those
matters. The first matter is the decision to separate design responsibilities

238. American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Architect with Standard Form of Architect's Services, AIA Document B141-1997, § 2.6.4.3
(reprinted in SWEET, supra note 57, app. A, at A-35).
239. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
240. American Institute of Architects, supra note 238, at app. A, at A035.
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for the atrium from the design responsibility for the rest of the project.24'
The second is the decision to designate a specific steel fabricator to
provide that design.242
The structural engineering of the steel frame and the qualifications of
the firm that provides that engineering are both matters of great
importance for the project. Has the architect made a considered,
professional judgment, upon which the developer is entitled to rely, that
the advantages of the design-build arrangement for the atrium outweigh
the advantages of more traditional arrangements in which a single
engineer, working as a consultant to the architect, would furnish the
structural design for the entire project? Similarly, may the developer
assume anything from the fact that the architect's project specifications
will identify the particular steel fabricator for the atrium frame?
From the architect's perspective, there are additional reasons why the
contract should comprehensively regulate the relationships between the
overall project design and the specialty designs. At a minimum, the
architect will retain responsibility for coordination of the design of
interfaces between the specialty features and the balance of the project.
Additionally, the architect should recognize that significant problems with
either the atrium or the security system may adversely affect the architect's
reputation and likely will lead to claims against the architect. The public
and the commercial development community will associate the architect
with any serious defects in the project, and if litigation results, the
architect will almost certainly become a defendant. For all these reasons,
the architect should prefer detailed contractual terms that clarify the
architect's review, oversight, and coordination role in relation to the
specialty designs.
In light of the potentially applicable contract and tort theories, counsel
for both parties should recognize the importance of addressing these
matters in the developer-architect agreement. The developer's counsel
might consider several contract provisions to confirm and protect the
developer's expectations. Perhaps it will be appropriate to include
representations from the architect concerning the decisions already made
that relate to the atrium design.243 Additionally (or alternatively), the
241. This is a decision that involves a subtle, but potentially critical, exercise of professional
judgment. See Fla. Eng'rs Mgmt. Corp. v. Newton, No. 02-2536PL, 2002 WL 31872627, at *10
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 20, 2002) (holding that it was permissible for an engineer to delegate
the responsibility for selecting a specialty engineer to a specialty contractor that was not licensed
as an engineer).
242. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. URS Co., Inc., No. 64496, 1994 WL 520862, at *1-3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 22, 1994), affid in partand rev'd in part,648 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 1995) (involving a suit
brought by a project owner against a project architect who recommended a specialty designer for
a planetarium dome design).
243. For example, the developer could ask the architect to represent that the conceptual design
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developer's counsel might suggest that the list to be incorporated into the
contract describing the scope of the architect's design services should
include the activities, already completed, of recommending the designbuild subcontract arrangement and selecting the particular steel fabricator
for the atrium.2' The architect's counsel also should prefer to address
these subjects contractually, primarily out of concern that they could lead
to a viable malpractice claim by the developer if problems later develop
with the atrium design.
Perhaps the negotiations will give contractual life to the developer's
assumptions, or perhaps they will lead to exculpatory disclosures and
disclaimers, or perhaps they will produce some other compromise not
immediately apparent to either party. For example, the negotiations might
lead to the realization that the architect's conceptual design is so unique
that it will be unacceptably expensive or difficult to design and build.
Considerations of this sort may produce a significant enhancement of the
architect's role relating to the atrium design, along with a corresponding
increase in the architect's fee. They might even lead to a revised
conceptual design or to a decision to reverse directions and place the
atrium design within the scope of the architect's services in the same way
that other engineering services are provided by the architect's consultants
who are part of the lead design team.
What is important here is not to promote a specific compromise.
Rather, these observations lead to the conclusion that, both as a practical
matter for the parties' sake and as a policy matter, it will be best if the
parties identify and assess the risks involved and then allocate those risks
by an advance agreement that takes into account which participant is best
able to control the risks. The alternative is to leave any disputes these
issues might otherwise produce to be resolved under tort principles.
Both parties (as well as the atrium fabricator) also should want the
contract to establish how to coordinate and integrate the atrium design
with the overall project design without delay or conflict. A somewhat
predictable result of negotiations concerning these matters is that the
agreement between the owner and the project architect might establish a
procedure by which the construction drawings for the atrium will be

meets certain functional requirements articulated by the developer and that it is feasible for the
fabricator to design and build the atrium.
244. It is not unusual for a design services agreement to be executed by the parties after the
design professional has already performed some services. The agreement may replace a letter
agreement or other short form or it may represent the first formal evidence of the parties' informal
agreement. In these situations, it is common to specify that the contract applies to certain services
already begun or completed. In this way, the contract clarifies what services are included in the
contract fee, and other contract provisions, such as representations or liability limits, effectively
become applicable to those services on a retroactive basis.
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submitted to the architect for limited, but adequately defined, purposes that
facilitate the interests of all participants in arriving at the final, complete
design for the entire project in a timely and efficient manner. The very act
of addressing these matters contractually also will encourage the parties
to allocate more effectively some of the more foreseeable risks of design
interface, omitted activities, 245 delays, conflicts, and errors relating to the
atrium design services.
Somewhat different considerations apply with respect to the security
system design. In the first place, in this case the decision to exclude the
specialty design from the architect's scope of services originates with the
county rather than with the architect. Additionally, the design interface
issues may be less extensive than those that the atrium design presents.
These considerations may make it more likely that the developer-architect
agreement will broadly exonerate the architect from any liability for
design problems associated with the security system. Or it may lead to a
request by the developer that the architect make recommendations on
certain aspects of the security system design that are important for the
overall project design but that might not otherwise be adequately or timely
addressed. If that is the case, then an appropriate increase in the architect's
fee probably also will follow.
In any event, the developer-architect agreement should establish a
detailed process for coordinating and integrating the security system
design into the overall project design. That process may mirror the process
relating to the atrium design except that it must reflect that coordination
between the architect and the security system designer in this case will be
through the developer rather than through the prime contractor.
Developer-Prime ContractorAgreement
As Part II demonstrates, special risk allocation issues arise when the
parties divide design responsibility between the owner's lead design team
and the construction team. 2 6 The leading contracting models assume either
that the owner will provide the design to the contractor or that a designbuilder will assume responsibility for the complete design as well as for
construction.2 4 7 In other words, under the two most common project
delivery systems, either the construction team has no material
responsibility for design or it has all responsibility for design. 248 When the

245. A vexing problem in construction disputes is the failure of the parties to identify and
assign responsibility for every activity required to complete the project. See 1 BRUNER &
O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 4:25-:28.
246. See supra Part II.D. 1-3.
247. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
248. As implied in the discussion that follows in the text, the building process invariably
involves the builder at least in limited design activities. See 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note
23, § 7:212.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/2

66

20061

Circo: Contract
Theory
and
Contract Practice:
Allocating Design
Responsi
IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
ALLOCATING
DESIGN
RESPONSIBILITY

owner's design team provides the design, the owner impliedly represents
to the prime contractor that the design is proper and sufficient for the
purposes of the project.249 The contractor must build the project as required
by the design documents, and typically warrants that the construction and
materials will be free from defects,250 but the owner retains the risk of
"' Although the contractor's responsibility in a traditional
design problems.25
project for such matters as shop drawings and proposed substitutions
blends construction with design services, 2 the distinction itself remains
meaningful for most purposes.253
Because in the hypothetical project the contractor, through its
subcontractor, will provide the atrium design that will be integrated into
the overall design furnished by the owner's design team, design and
construction responsibilities are not merely blended-they overlap and
intersect at multiple, critical points. The required design integration is
arguably more complicated in this project because the developer will
furnish most of the project design via the lead architect, but will provide
the design for the security system via the separate consultant, while the
prime contractor will provide the atrium design through a subcontractor.
This arrangement requires coordination involving three distinct design
firms that may not necessarily function or react uniformly. For this reason,
it is important that the agreement between the prime contractor and the
developer adequately establishes a process for submitting information to
the developer's design representatives and obtaining design input and
decisions binding on the developer.
One of the other critical questions the developer and the prime
contractor should address is how the prime contractor's construction
warranty should apply with respect to the atrium. If the parties use a
customary construction contract and include the atrium design within the
scope of the prime contractor's work, they must consider whether or to
what extent the contractor's warranty of the "work" should apply to the
atrium design. Design contracts alone do not imply any warranty of the
design services,254 and design professionals normally will not agree to

249. See United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1918).
250. See 3 BRUNER& O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 9:53 (discussing express, oral, and implied
warranties).
251. See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. of N.Y. v. Mars Assocs., 520 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (App. Div. 1987).
252. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. N. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W.2d 415, 425
(Tex. 1995) (holding that both the project engineer and the contractor could be liable for an
inadequate design detail omitted from the engineer's plans and later defectively supplied in the
shop drawing submitted by the contractor and approved by the engineer).
253. An important difference between contemporary shared-design practices and the
traditional responsibility of a contractor for limited aspects of design is that shared-design practices
often extend to critical design details or to substantially all design for major project features.
254. See City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 423-25 (Minn. 1978).
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express warranties.15' This is because the prevailing standard for
performance of design services assures only a non-negligent design, not
an error-free one. 6 The prime contractor (and its surety, if any), therefore,
will be reluctant to extend the normal construction contract warranty to the
atrium design services. Because in this case the atrium will be provided by
the steel fabricator on a design-build basis, the fabricator, as the designbuild subcontractor, may be prepared to offer a warranty that extends to
the design. For example, if the atrium is based on an established design
derived from previous projects, the prime contractor and the fabricator
may negotiate a performance or maintenance guarantee based on objective
criteria. If so, the prime contractor may propose passing through those
assurances from the fabricator to the developer as an exclusive, limited
warranty concerning the atrium.
The prime contractor's concerns extend beyond the warranty issue.
General contractors are in the business of managing construction risks.
They are able to do so profitably because of their expertise in controlling
the most vexing construction problems, such as scheduling and
coordinating multiple construction activities, evaluating the qualifications
and financial status of trade contractors and suppliers, managing project
cash flow, overseeing the quality of construction, and many other matters
required to complete a project in accordance with plans and specifications
and on-time, within budget.257 The hypothetical prime contractor may not
be in a good position to manage or control risks associated with design
services for an aspect of the project as significant as the atrium. To do so
may require the ability to judge the qualifications of design professionals,
to anticipate and address problems unique to the design process, and even
to assess the adequacy or quality of plans, calculations, and design
judgments. As a result, unless the steel fabricator is financially strong and
has a good record for satisfactory performance as a design-build
subcontractor, the prime contractor will certainly attempt to tailor the
contractual provisions to deal with the atrium as a distinct category within
the contractual scope of work. For example, the prime contractor may be
willing to accept responsibility to coordinate and manage the fabricator's
construction activities but not to accept responsibility for the fabricator's
failure to perform.
The atrium design also presents other challenges for the developer in
relation to the prime contract. The most fundamental question is whether
the arrangement provides adequate remedies for the developer if there are
problems with the atrium design. Because the developer is not a party to
255. See 5 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 17:24.
256. See Flatt, supra note 59, at 619-21.
257. See 2 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, §§ 7:1-: 13 (exploring risk management and
risk analysis strategies in construction projects).
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a contract with the steel fabricator who will design the atrium, contract
remedies in favor of the developer against the steel fabricator require
special attention.258 A court would be reluctant to imply third-party
beneficiary rights into the atrium subcontract absent an express provision
in the subcontract that establishes that the prime contractor and the steel
fabricator intended the developer to have remedies for breach of the
fabricator's design services obligations." 9 Furthermore, even if the
fabricator's engineering staff commits professional malpractice, the
economic loss rule may deny the developer a tort remedy.26 If the contract
limits the prime contractor's responsibility or liability with respect to
design defects, the developer must negotiate for direct rights against the
steel fabricator. 261' Even if the prime contractor agrees to warrant the
specialty design as part of the construction "work," the developer should
consider whether the contractor's insurance and any surety bond
adequately cover that obligation.262
Assuming that the prime contractor successfully negotiates to exclude
the atrium design from the normal warranty of the work, the developer still
may logically expect the prime contractor to take responsibility for the
timely completion of the atrium design documents. Because the prime
contractor will control payments to the steel fabricator, it may be
reasonable for the prime contractor to assume certain basic responsibilities
for the timely completion of all obligations of the fabricator under the
subcontract, including design activities. 263
Based on these considerations, the prime contractor's counsel might
initially propose to the developer's counsel that the design services for the
atrium should be completely excluded from the contractor's warranty,2 4
that the developer should acknowledge that the prime contractor is not
qualified or licensed to provide professional engineering services, and that
258. See Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 144 N.W.2d 303,311-13 (Iowa 1966).
259. See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 391-93 (S.D. Iowa
1973).
260. See Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tortfor ConstructionDefects:
A CriticalAnalysis, 40 S.C. L. REv. 891, 927 (1989).
261. See Midwest Dredging Co. v. McAninch Corp., 424 N.W.2d 216, 224-25 (Iowa 1988)
(recognizing that what the contract says is the best evidence of whether the contracting parties
intended to create third-party beneficiary rights).
262. See supra Part H.D.7-8.
263. If the prime contractor had independently selected the steel fabricator, a court might hold
that the prime contractor implicitly represented to the developer that the fabricator was qualified
to perform the necessary design services. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 cmt. b
(1965). But the hypothetical posits that the developer's architect designated the steel fabricator.
264. The contractor's counsel would not need to propose such a provision concerning the
security system design because, by furnishing that design through its security consultant, the
developer impliedly represents to the contractor that the security system design is proper and
sufficient. Cf. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918).
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the atrium steel fabricator should be exclusively responsible for the atrium
design. The owner's counsel might respond with a proposal to require the
contractor to retain responsibility to manage and coordinate completion of
the atrium design in a timely manner and to secure third-party beneficiary
status for the owner against the steel fabricator in the event of design
errors and omissions. Under these circumstances it also would be
appropriate for the developer-prime contractor agreement to include terms
requiring the prime contractor to assure that all engineering documents
relating to the atrium will be prepared and sealed by a properly licensed
engineer, and it also should include detailed requirements concerning the
fabricator's professional liability insurance. Both parties' interests suggest
the need for a design approval process that is consistent with the process
established under the developer-architect agreement. Finally, the prime
contractor might assign to the developer any specific assurances or
remedies relating to the atrium design that the subcontract establishes in
the prime contractor's favor.265
The discussions of the developer-architect and the developer-prime
contractor agreements suggest both the possibilities and the limitations
inherent in attempting to address shared-design issues through a series of
traditional bilateral agreements. A few additional notes are in order about
the two other key contracts involved in the shared-design features of the
hypothetical project.
Developer-Security ConsultantAgreement
One of the notable features of the hypothetical project is that the
developer will enter into two separate design services agreements in
addition to assigning the atrium design to the prime contractor's
construction team. In order to avoid conflicts and inconsistent design
directives, it will be important to establish a process to coordinate the
security consultant's design services with the overall project design by the
lead design team. Presumably, this will require that the developer-security
consultant agreement adopt submittal and review processes consistent with
those included in the developer-prime contractor agreement.
The security consultant also may be concerned about the extent to
which the lead architect's role could overshadow the consultant's ability
to participate sufficiently in the process by which the security system
design is incorporated into the project design and then is implemented by
the prime contractor. This may lead to some special contract provisions.
For example, the contract might provide that certain design details,
construction submissions, and construction activities will require the
consultant's review or approval even though the architect will play the
main role in contract administration on behalf of the developer for the

265. See infra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
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overall project. The developer also will probably need to coordinate the
consultant's agreement with some of the developer's obligations to the
county. This may mean, for example, that the security consultant should
acknowledge in its agreement with the developer that the county is a thirdparty beneficiary of the consultant's services.
Prime Contractor-AtriumSteel FabricatorSubcontract
The subcontract between the prime contractor and the steel fabricator
should conform to the relevant provisions of the agreements between the
developer and the architect, the developer and the contractor, and the
developer and the security consultant. This means that all four contracts
should establish consistent and complementary procedures for design
documentation to be reviewed by all affected parties, revised to respond
appropriately to comments and questions raised by those parties, and
finalized and incorporated into the project design in a coordinated fashion.
Some special provisions may be necessary to assure the steel fabricator
that the architect (and possibly the security consultant as well) will
respond in a timely and adequate manner to requests for clarification or
decisions concerning the project design that may affect the atrium.26
Additionally, the subcontract must incorporate and pass through to the
steel fabricator any commitments that the prime contractor made to the
developer concerning the performance of the design services, third-party
remedies to be available to the developer, and professional liability
insurance to be maintained by the steel fabricator.
The subcontract also will define the relationship between the parties
concerning design activities. If the design services required of the steel
fabricator are routine in the industry, then the relationship may follow the
typical contractor-subcontractor pattern in which the subcontractor simply
agrees to perform the subcontracted work in accordance with the prime
contract. This may be the case, for example, if the atrium is essentially a
standard product that need only be modified in limited respects to meet
special criteria provided by the project architect. If that is the situation, the
prime contractor may be able to manage the steel fabricator's activities in
the same manner that it manages the activities of other vendors who
perform ancillary installation obligations. 267 As the earlier discussion
shows, however, the particular circumstances involved may be sufficiently
unique that the prime contractor will be neither qualified to manage the
design activities involved nor willing to incur the full liability to the

266. See 5 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 17:9.
267. A common example of this occurs when a design-build subcontractor furnishes and
installs the heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and cooling system. See 2 BRUNER& O'CONNOR,
supra note 23, § 5:79. Note, however, that in the hypothetical situation, the prime contractor does
not have the level of influence and control often enjoyed by a prime contractor who has
independently selected the subcontractor in the first place.
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developer for those activities.268
The prime contractor and the steel fabricator may consider several
alternatives to redefine their contractual arrangement in relation to the
atrium design. The most direct and comprehensive approach would be for
the prime contractor to secure from the steel fabricator an express design
warranty of the atrium design that runs in favor of the developer as well
as the prime contractor.269 That may be unacceptable, however, to the steel
fabricator, who may adhere to the customary view of designers that design
liability should be based on professional negligence and not warranty. The
steel fabricator may especially object to an express design warranty if it is
retaining an outside engineering firm to furnish the design because in that
case the fabricator may be unable to pass the warranty obligation on to the
engineering firm. The steel fabricator may be willing to provide an
alternative form of assurance of a more specific and limited nature, such
as a warranty that the atrium will remain watertight for a specified
period,270 or it may offer an objective performance guarantee of its work.
A performance guarantee may be especially appropriate for certain
specialty components or systems.27 ' In the case of the atrium, for example,
a performance guarantee might provide that the welds must meet certain
specifications when tested in accordance with an agreed procedure. 272 The

prime contractor, therefore, may wish to explore with the steel fabricator
whether a performance test for the atrium frame system or some other
form of special assurance is feasible.273 If, at the time the prime contractor
is negotiating the prime contract, it can anticipate what design warranty or
other assurance the atrium subcontract will provide, then, as previously
suggested, the prime contractor might propose to the developer that the
prime contractor's sole responsibility for the atrium design will be to
assign to the developer the fabricator's extended warranty, performance
guarantee, or other special assurance.274

268. See supra Part ll.D.5.
269. To the extent the fabricator is a design-builder for the atrium, even if the subcontract does
not expressly warrant the design, a court may recognize an implied warranty of design as well as
construction. See Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'g Co., 442 P.2d 621, 624 (Wash. 1968). Additionally,
if a court views the steel fabricator as a product manufacturer for product liability purposes, the
fabricator may incur strict product liability. See Commercial Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
270. See, e.g., Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
271. See 2 BRUNER& O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 7:125.
272. See, e.g., Petrocon Eng'g, Inc. v. MAC Equip., Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 599,601,603 (E.D.
Tex. 2002).
273. Especially because the owner's architect provided certain design data or criteria for the
atrium, any performance guarantee by the atrium subcontractor should be stated in unambiguous
terms. Cf Kurland v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 258, 261 (Ct. App. 1967).
274. See 6 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 19:52.57; cf Holden Farms, Inc. v. Hog
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C. A Proposalfor Multi-PartyProject Design Agreements
Part 1LI.B demonstrates that participants in a shared-design project can
resolve some important issues by making significant adjustments to the
bilateral contracts called for by the traditional project delivery system. In
some cases, however, a project-wide solution may require a project-wide
approach that brings the design parties and other affected participants
under an umbrella agreement and that deals comprehensively and
exclusively with the shared-design responsibilities.
Before hardened negotiators protest that this suggestion smacks of an
overly optimistic expectation that multiple parties can strike a balance that
will serve competing interests, they should consider again what the
alternative may be to a comprehensive contract solution to the shareddesign problem. 275 Those who fail to identify and allocate shared-design
liability by contract may find the common law standing by to allocate
those risks for them after the fact. An aggrieved participant, resorting to
tort law, is free to seek a remedy based on broad social policies rather than
on the commercial factors that actually motivated the parties when they
voluntarily entered into the commercial relationships involved. Because
tort law is dynamic, it is impossible to predict what judicial attitudes may
emerge in response to novel claims in the untested world of shared design.
To bring the potential significance of a multi-party contract approach
into sharper focus, let us revisit one of the most difficult legal issues that
may arise in shared-design projects. Should the law provide a remedy for
purely economic loss suffered by one participant due to the fault of another
participant if no contract exists between the offender and the injured party?
This, as we have already noted, is a situation addressed-with much
inconsistency and disagreement-when courts consider the economic loss
rule in tort cases.276 Third-party beneficiary provisions in separate bilateral
arrangements offer a partial solution to the problem.277 But separate
bilateral contracts cannot effectively regulate, limit, or deny the remedies
Slat, Inc., 347 F.3d 1055, 1060 & n. 1 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the construction contract limited
the duration of the contractor's warranty of manufactured materials to the period warranted by the
manufacturer).
275. While the idea of a project-wide agreement to govern the relationships created by shared
design may seem radical, consider as an analogy the firmly established role of "general conditions"
that are made a part of the owner-prime contractor agreement and then incorporated into each
subcontract for construction work. Indeed, in a situation in which an owner hires multiple prime
contractors for distinct aspects of a project, the American Institute of Architects' form of general
conditions indirectly attempts to regulate the relationships among the separate contractors in a way
that is somewhat analogous to the proposed use of a multi-party design agreement. See American
Institute of Architects, supra note 86, at app. C, at C-2.
276. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
277. Cf 5 BRUNER& O'CONNOR, supra note 23, § 17:30.
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a court might award to an injured participant who is not a party to the
agreement. In other words, a bilateral contract can confer legal rights on
a third party, but it cannot bind a non-consenting third party to the terms
of the contract.
In appropriate situations, a project-wide design participation agreement
might significantly improve the picture. Because each affected participant
would join in a common agreement, the rights of all participants could be
made subject to a coherent set of limitations, procedures, and conditions
that address considerations uniquely important when design
responsibilities are shared. A project design agreement also could advance
other objectives that require project-wide solutions. For example, a multiparty contract will assure that fully consistent principles and procedures
apply to all of the interdependent relationships involved; it also may
enhance communications, reduce misunderstandings, foster collaboration,
help bring hidden problems to light, and facilitate project-wide
professional liability coverage and other creative risk management
techniques.
In fact, project design agreements might routinely enhance the project
delivery system for projects that include significant shared-design
responsibilities. They may prove especially valuable in more complex
situations. This would include projects in which the owner as well as the
prime contractor retains multiple designers and those in which multiple
subcontractors may retain outside design consultants. Ideally, the owner's
legal counsel would prepare a discussion draft of the agreement in the
early stages of the planning process, probably in consultation with the
owner's architect or project manager, and possibly with the assistance of
one or more other advisors. While each project would involve unique
considerations, a common scheme might include several key features.
* Bid packages, requests for proposals, and other pre-contract
information could include the form of the agreement and could
designate those participants who should join in the agreement.
• For private projects, the prime contractor and other key design
parties might be given the opportunity to propose changes before
any party signs the agreement, but execution of the agreement in the
form finally agreed upon could be made a condition precedent to
the effectiveness of each participant's separate contract for services.
For public works projects, however, competitive bidding standards
might restrict any negotiations concerning the terms of the
agreement once the bid package has been issued.278
* The agreement could include or incorporate preliminary design
information prepared by the project architect or others, including

278. Cf. Hoiten v. City of Canistota, 579 N.W.2d 12, 14, 16-17 (S.D. 1998).
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design criteria and any performance standards for each specialty
design.
It also could include a comprehensive submittal and review process
the parties must follow and a detailed matrix of design activities
that specifies who is responsible to prepare, review, comment on,
and finalize specified designs and whether anyone has the right but
not the duty to review certain design details. It also might address
what consequences flow from a party's review or failure to review
submittals.
The agreement would include appropriate representations,
acknowledgments, and agreements relating to matters of common
interest to the parties. For example:
o The project architect's representations that certain preliminary
design information contained or incorporated in the agreement
conforms to applicable professional standards;
o Acknowledgments by appropriate parties that they have
reviewed and approved the division of design responsibility and
the coordination procedures reflected in the agreement and that
they agree that these matters are consistent with sound design
and construction practices;
o The prime contractor's representations that it has reviewed the
preliminary design information and the design matrix and has
determined that they are consistent with sound construction and
scheduling practices and consistent with the construction
schedule for the project;
o Each specialty designer's representation that it has reviewed the
preliminary design information and the design matrix and has
determined that they provide an appropriate basis upon which
the specialty designer may perform its design responsibilities;
o Representations concerning the licensing status of each
participant, and each design party's agreement that all its
professional design activities will be performed by or under the
direction of a properly licensed professional and that the
appropriately licensed professional will seal all its plans and
other design materials that are required to be sealed in
accordance with applicable legal requirements and industry
standards;
o Each specialty designer's acknowledgment that the design
submittal process provides an appropriate procedure and
adequate time for the specialty designer to perform its design
responsibilities; and
o Each participant's acknowledgment that no participant has made
any representations to the other participants relating to the
project except for the express representations contained in the
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project design agreement, and the further acknowledgment by
each participant that it has no right to rely on or enforce any
representations, agreements, or other provisions relating
to the
279
project under any agreement to which it is not a party.
* The agreement also should specify insurance and bonding
requirements, including any requirements for the parties to
participate in any controlled insurance programs or other projectbased risk management programs.
* A force majeure provision may be included to govern delays in the
design submittal process.
* Appropriate provisions concerning enforcement and remedial
matters may cover reciprocal indemnity obligations, waivers for
insurance subrogation purposes, limitations on the liability of
participants to each other, choice of law, forum selection, and
dispute resolution.
• Other miscellaneous provisions might cover important or technical
definitions, attorneys' fees, and other litigation or dispute resolution
expenses, and other matters affecting contract administration or
interpretation.
Depending on the circumstances, many other provisions may be
appropriate. Although every project will present some unique issues that
might be addressed in the project design agreement, there are a few
matters of limited application that are worthwhile to consider in this
overview.
* If several participants may become parties to the agreement after it
is executed by an initial group of participants, the agreement should
designate the design roles of those who will join later, and it should
include procedures by which the parties acknowledge that the
agreement constitutes a legally enforceable agreement among all
those who sign. This may be applicable, for example, when the
owner, the project architect, and the prime contractor sign the
agreement initially, and required subcontractors join as the prime
contractor awards subcontracts.
* An agreement might contemplate that some of the design
participants may be given the option whether to sign the agreement
or to sign a separate waiver of all benefits of the agreement. This

279. No-reliance clauses often prove valuable in litigation even though they are frequently
challenged on the basis that they are at odds with the actual conduct of the parties. See 8 MARTIN
D. FERN & DANiEuE F. FERN, WARREN'S FORMS OF AGREEMENTS § 101.2 (2005) (discussing the
desirability of including an integration clause in a business agreement); see also Vigortone AG
Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that a noreliance clause, in contrast to a simple integration clause, should be effective between commercial
parties).
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could be a useful device, for example, to induce prospective parties
to join in the agreement if it includes attractive contractual limits on
liability. It also may be a necessary option when the owner
anticipates that a dominant party may be unwilling to join.
0 Some situations may require a procedure by which modifications to
the agreement may become effective and binding on all parties if
the proposed modifications meet predetermined criteria, receive the
written approval of key participants, such as the owner, the
architect, and the prime contractor, and are subject to protest or
dispute resolution procedures.
A project design agreement can serve a purpose similar to that served
by a participation agreement in a multi-party financing transaction or other
complex business transaction.2 80 The agreement creates a contractual
relationship among many parties for the limited purpose of issues of
common interest, but it does not replace the bilateral contracts that pairs
of participants will enter into separately to define their other rights and
obligations. Although this article has examined the idea of a multi-party
design agreement as an alternative to the design-bid-build project delivery
system, the concept also would have merit in other shared-design
situations, and even in projects that do not involve shared design but that
create other forms of complex, interdependent relationships among
construction participants. These would include situations in which the
owner manages the project and directly retains multiple designers or
contractors. Design-builders also may find the concept helpful in
coordinating and managing the activities of multiple design-build
subcontractors.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the construction industry has only begun to absorb the unique
contract attributes of shared-design projects, it has the innate ability to do
so efficiently and effectively. The industry is notably adept at developing
project delivery systems and contracting structures that respond to a
constantly changing environment and that permit each participant a
commercially reasonable opportunity to protect its own legitimate interests
through contract negotiations and risk management techniques. Design and
construction contracting practices must adapt to shared design in ways that
achieve the efficient and sound allocation of the design liability risks
involved. Inevitably, new contracting patterns must emerge that better
serve the interests of those who participate in shared-design projects. This
natural evolutionary process should give rise to refinements in contractual

280. See, e.g., Charles J. Hamilton, Jr. & Anne E. Griffith, SubordinateMortgagesand Other
986 (2001).
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arrangements, new risk management techniques, and other developments
that will serve the interests of the parties and the industry. These
circumstances may eventually give life to significant variations on
established project delivery systems.
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